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The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds: 
Financial Innovation and Investor Protection 
Houman B. Shadab t 
Abstract: A persistent theme underlying contemporary debates about 
financial regulation is how to protect investors from the growing complexity of 
financial markets, new risks, and other changes brought about by financial 
innovation. Increasingly relevant to this debate are the leading innovators of 
complex investment strategies known as hedge funds. A hedge fund is a private 
investment company that is not subject to the full range of restrictions on 
investment activities and disclosure obligations imposed by federal securities 
laws, that compensates management in part with a fee based on annual profits, 
and typically engages in the active trading of financial instruments. 
Hedge funds engage in financial innovation by pursuing novel investment 
strategies that lower market risk (beta) and may increase returns attributable 
to manager skill (alpha). Despite the funds' unique costs and risk properties, 
their historical performance suggests that the ultimate result of hedge fund 
innovation is to help investors reduce economic losses during market 
downturns. In 2008, as losses from the U.S. subprime mortgage market 
transformed into an international financial crisis, the value of global equities 
dropped 42 percent while hedge funds worldwide lost a comparatively smaller 
19 percent for their investors. By increasing investors' ability to maximize risk-
adjusted returns, hedge funds advance the same goal that federal investor 
protection regulation seeks to advance. 
This Article argues that the beneficial outcomes hedge funds attain for their 
investors are largely attributable to the legal regime under which they operate. 
The hedge fund legal regime includes not only federal securities law but also 
the entity and contract law provisions governing the fund, its manager, and its 
investors. Applicable federal laws enable the funds to pursue innovative 
investment strategies by employing the trifecta of leverage, short sales, and 
derivatives. The entity and contract law governance of hedge funds provides 
high-powered incentives for fund managers to engage in and capture the gains 
from financial innovation. 
t Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. B.A. 1998, University of California at Berkeley; 
J .D. 2002, University of Southern California. 1 would like to thank for their invaluable comments Jerry 
Ellig, Timothy Becker, Arthur Laby, Larry Ribstein, Victor Fleischer and other participants at the 
University of Illinois Fall 2008 Corporate Colloquium, and for their invaluable research assistance Brian 
Andrew, Mark Adams, Anthony Skriba and Katelyn E. Christ. All errors are my own. This article 
originally appeared in the Working Paper Series of the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. 
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A general lesson from the law and economics of hedge funds is that when a 
legal regime permits financial intermediaries to be flexible in their investment 
strategies while aligning the incentives of investors and innovators through 
performance fees and co-investment by managers, financial innovation is likely 
to complement investor protection without wide-ranging regulation. The role of 
hedge funds in advancing the same goal as investor protection regulation 
suggests that they should legally be available to a broader class of investors. 
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The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds: 
Financial Innovation and Investor Protection 
INTRODUCTION 
A persistent theme underlying contemporary debates about financial 
regulation is how to protect investors from the growing complexity of financial 
markets, new risks, and other changes brought about by financial innovation. 1 
Increasingly relevant to this debate are the leading innovators of complex 
investment strategies known as hedge funds. A hedge fund is a private 
investment company that is not subject to the full range of restrictions on 
investment activities and disclosure obligations imposed by federal securities 
laws, that compensates management in part with a fee based on annual profits, 
and typicaiiy engages in the active trading of financial instruments. 2 As a type 
of financial intermediary that offers investors a means to safeguard and grow 
their capital, hedge funds represent a third stage in the development of 
investment intermediaries after commercial banks and mutual funds. Although 
banks allow depositors to earn relatively safe returns on their capital, returns 
from bank deposits are typically lower than those from stocks and other 
investment opportunities. 3 In addition, while mutual funds allow investors to 
benefit from the relatively high returns of investing in stocks, mutual funds 
expose investors to substantial losses from overall market downturns. 4 Hedge 
funds, by contrast, employ innovative investment strategies to attain relatively 
high returns while simultaneously reducing exposures to market risk. As 
suggested by their historical performance, hedge funds are consistently able to 
reduce losses during market downturns. 5 
In 2008, as losses from the U.S. subprime mortgage market transformed 
into an international financial crisis, global equities lost 42 percent of their 
I. See, e.g., Robert K. Steel, Under Secretary for Domestic Finance, Remarks Before the American 
Enterprise Institute, Nov. 13, 2007 (noting the challenge of constructing "a regulatory system ensuring . 
. . investor protection" yet still "adaptive to the accelerating rate of innovation and complexity in the 
financial services industry"), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/hpl 240.htm; 
Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. 400, 413 (proposed Jan. 4, 
2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230 & 275) (justifying increasing the net worth required to invest 
in hedge funds because "the increase in ... private pool complexity since 1982 ... underscores the need 
to strengthen investor protections"). 
2. See generally Houman 8. Shadab, Fending/or Themselves: Creating a U.S. Hedge Fund Market 
for Retail Investors, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. PUB. & POL'Y 251 (2008). See also SEC, IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, STAFF REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION 3 (Sept. 29, 2003) (noting there is no legal or universally accepted definition of "hedge 
fund") [hereinafter SEC STAFF REPORT]. 
3. See infra note 147 and 188 and accompanying text. 
4. See infra notes 210 and 322 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra Section 111.C. 
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value while hedge funds worldwide lost a comparatively smaller 19 percent for 
their investors and with lower monthly volatility.6 Although large numbers of 
hedge funds were closed due to poor returns from the ensuing economic 
turmoil, hedge fund risk taking was far more prudent than that in the banking 
sector, which several times was in danger of collapsing and received 
government aid to prevent a massive disruption of the financial system. 7 
To be sure, investors were justifiably frustrated with hedge fund returns, 
managers preventing investors from withdrawing capital, and certain aspects of 
hedge fund reporting. 8 Going forward, investors will likely see lower fees, 
smaller minimum investments, and more timely access to their own capital; and 
the funds will likely increase disclosures and rely even more on independent 
service providers.9 The industry is also likely to become less leveraged, face 
greater competition from passive replicator funds, and more concentrated as 
smaller funds close, are bought out, or are unable to afford to comply with new 
and costly risk-management practices and new regulation. 10 
Nonetheless, the rapid growth and increasing sophistication of the hedge 
fund industry over the last decade seems to have enabled it to adapt to the new 
realties created by the financial crisis. As the financial crisis continues, hedge 
funds will likely be well-positioned to take advantage of new investment 
opportunities and continue to meet investor demand for returns less correlated 
to the overall market than those achieved by traditional investment strategies. 11 
6. The MSC! World Index fell from I S88.80 on January I, 2008 to 920.226 on December 31, 2008. 
See MSC! Index Performance, available at 
http://www.mscibarra.com/products/indices/stdindex/performance.html (follow The World Index Free) 
(data on file with author) CREDIT SUISSE TREMONT, ONE FOR THE RECORD BOOKS: HEDGE FUND 
PERFORMANCE IN 2008 I, Jan. 2009 (displaying the returns to the Credit/Suisse Tremont Hedge Fund 
Index in 2008 and comparing the standard derivation of the Index with that of global and U.S. equities). 
7. See Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, Troubled Asset Relief Program and the Federal Reserve's 
Liquidity Facilities, Before the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 
November 18, 2008 (stating that Federal Reserve provision of funds to banking institutions was intended 
to "prevent an international financial collapse"); Remarks by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, 
Introducing the Financial Stability Plan, Tuesday, February 10, 2009 (stating that government support of 
banks is necessary to prevent "a complete collapse of our financial system"). 
8. EDHEC-RISK AND ASSET MANAGEMENT RESEARCH CENTRE, HEDGE FUND REPORTING SURVEY, 
NOVEMBER 2008, available at http://www.hedgeweek.com/redirector/2034/289403. 
9. See FINAlternatives, New Hedge Fund Platform Provides Access To Top Tier Managers, Jan. 
30, 2009, available at http://www.finalternatives.com/node/6797; Tom Sullivan, Better Disclosure, 
Courtesy Madoff, BARRON'S, Jan. 27, 2009, available at 
http://online.barrons.com/article/SBl2327S439344011621.html; James Mackintosh, Fund Plans Third-
Party Checks, FINANCIAL TIMES, March I, 2009; Ivy Schmerken, New Era in Hedge Fund 
Transparency?, ADVANCED TRADING, Jan. 20, 2009. 
10. FINAlternatives, Hedge Fund leverage Falls By Half, March 3, 2009; Joseph A. Giannone, As 
Hedge Funds Flop, Replication Funds Get Chance, REUTERS, Jan. 26, 2009. 
11. See Tommaso Sanzin, Manager Capacity vs. Market Capacity, AllAboutAlpha.com, Jan. 4, 
2009; Steve Johnson, Change on the Cards for Hedge Funds, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 18, 2009 
(reporting that a hedge fund consultant stated that "[ w ]e have got 30 new managers launching at the 
moment, which is more than I have ever had in the last 12 years"); FINAlternatives, Global Hedge Fund 
Assets Fall To $1.8T In 2008, March S, 2009 (reporting that in 2008 SS new U.S. hedge funds that 
raised $50 million or more were launched in contrast to 81 in 2007); FINAlternative, Hedge Funds See 
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Although hedge funds can no longer be considered "absolute return" vehicles, 
in the sense of producing positive returns in all market conditions as was often 
claimed by hedge fund industry professionals, their massive outperformance of 
the general market in the worst of economic conditions suggests that the funds 
deserve their namesake. 
This Article argues that the beneficial outcomes hedge funds attain for their 
investors are largely attributable to the legal regime under which they operate. 
Although the benefits of hedge funds are widely recognized, 12 that these 
benefits are systematically related to the federal securities regime and internal 
governance structures applicable to the funds is underappreciated. 13 While 
scholars have attributed the unique benefits of hedge fund activists to the legal 
regime under which the funds operate, 14 this Article moves beyond the 
relatively small group of hedge funds that seek to influence company managers 
and analyzes the dominant mode of hedge fund activity which consists of 
trading financiai instruments and other assets. Failing to draw broader 
conclusions may have important policy implications, as financial innovation by 
hedge funds generally has the result of protecting investor wealth during 
market downturns. 
Part I examines the law applicable to hedge funds. Although the hedge fund 
industry is made up of a very diverse array of investment funds (not all of 
which technically "hedge" their investments), two aspects of their governing 
regime make the funds distinct. The first aspect is the absence of legal restraints 
on their investment strategies. While the law restricts banks and mutual funds 
in how they may invest or trade financial instruments, hedge funds face no 
legal barriers in utilizing the trifecta of leverage, short sales, and derivatives to 
achieve their objectives for investors. 15 Second are hedge funds' uncorporate 
governance structures, which are characterized by managerial co-investment 
into the fund, performance-based fees, and virtually complete discretion by the 
manager in investing the fund's assets and choosing under what circumstances 
'Lifetime' Opportunity In 2009, Jan. 23, 2009; Alex Akesson, Eurekahedge Forecasts More Hedge 
Fund Launches in 2009, HEDGECO.NET, Jan. 27, 2009. 
12. See, e.g., SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 4-5; Jean-Pierre Mustier & Alain Dubois, Risks 
and Return of Banking Activities Related to Hedge Funds, Banque de France, Financial Stability 
Review-Special Issue on Hedge Funds 88-89, April 2007. 
13. See Bhaswar Gupta & Edward Szado, Hedge Fund Legal Structure and its Impact on 
Performance 8, Center for International Securities and Derivatives Markets, University of 
Massachusetts at Amherst-Eugene M. Isenberg School of Management Working Paper, May 20, 2008 
(noting that "very little research has focused on the interactions between hedge fund legal structures and 
their risk, performance or strategy focus"). 
14. See infra notes 202-203. 
15. An investment is leveraged to the extent borrowed funds are used to make the investment or the 
investment otherwise has exposure which magnifies gains or losses. A short sale is a way to profit from 
a price decline. It requires the short seller to borrow securities, sell them, repurchase them at a lower 
price, and return the securities to the lender. A derivative is a financial instrument, such as stock options 
and futures, whose price is derived from the value of some underlying asset. See FRAN<;:OIS-SERGE 
LHABITANT, HANDBOOK ON HEDGE FUNDS 151-52, 126-29, 142-50 (2006). 
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investors may withdraw their capital. 
Part II explains how the legal regime applicable to hedge funds facilitates 
financial innovation. Hedge funds innovate by implementing novel investment 
strategies to stay competitive and prevent investors from withdrawing capital. 
These novel investment strategies often include utilizing innovations in 
financial instruments such as complex derivatives. Consistent with the research 
on innovation and governance more generally, hedge fund governance devices 
facilitate innovation by providing managers with the flexibility to adapt to 
changing economic conditions and high-powered incentives to capture the 
gains from innovation. 
Nonetheless, hedge fund innovation is not without its downsides. Relative 
to investing in stocks and other liquid assets, hedge funds create unique costs 
for their investors in the form of higher company-specific risk and short-term 
limitations on the ability of investors to withdraw their capital. On balance, 
however, innovation by hedge funds helps investors to diversify a traditional 
portfolio of stocks and bonds and thereby reduce exposures to overall market 
risk. As suggested by empirical studies on the sources of hedge fund returns, 
the superior risk-adjusted performance of hedge funds does not stem solely 
from the skills of hedge fund managers. Hedge fund returns seem to also stem 
from the unique strategies that hedge funds pursue which, at root, are enabled 
and incentivized by the legal regime under which the funds operate. 
The ultimate result of hedge fund innovation is analyzed in Part III, which 
shows that, by helping investors to maximize risk-adjusted returns, hedge funds 
advance the same goal that federal investor protection regulation seeks to 
advance. Insofar as the outcomes that hedge funds produce for their own 
investors are concerned, the current regulatory regime provides sufficient 
protection for investors. Fundamental reform is not warranted except to 
broaden the range of investors able to benefit from hedge funds. 16 
I. THE HEDGE FUND LEGAL REGIME 
Numerous sources of law apply to hedge funds, and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) is the primary federal agency tasked with hedge 
fund regulation and oversight. 17 Hedge funds are governed by the entity law of 
16. The impact that hedge funds have on investors in other companies, the funds' relationship to 
systemic risk, and the regulatory issues implicated by such matters, are beyond the scope of this Article. 
17. The discussion of law applicable to hedge funds in this Part is limited primarily to those laws 
which are most relevant to the economic activities of hedge funds described in Parts 11 and 1ll, and is by 
no means exhaustive. Other bodies of law which are potentially applicable to hedge funds and are not 
discussed in this Article include state law and federal regulation under the Commodity Exchange Act for 
hedge funds trading commodity interests, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act as it applies to 
hedge funds accepting capital from certain qualifying pension investors, and various industry-wide 
efforts at self-regulation or the adoption of best practices. See SCOTI J. LEDERMAN, HEDGE FUND 
REGULATION § 7:2 (2007) (discussing pension related regulation); id. at §§ 4:5, 6: 13 (discussing 
commodities-related regulation); Press Release, United States Treasury Department, PWG Private-
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the state or offshore jurisdiction in which they are organized, along with the 
law of contract governing their operating agreements. As investment advisers 
to the funds they manage, hedge fund managers are also governed by state and 
federal investment adviser law. As issuers of securities, and as purchasers and 
sellers of the securities of other companies, hedge funds are governed by 
federal securities regulation. However, the funds operate so as to be totally 
excluded from federal law applicable to investment companies. Nonetheless, 
hedge funds are fully subject to federal prohibitions on fraud, market 
manipulation, and insider trading, and must make disclosures in connection 
with trading registered securities. 
A. Uncorporate Governance 
A "hedge fund" consists of three basic entities: investors, the fund itself, 
and the investment adviser/management company. 18 U.S.-based hedge funds 
typically adopt some type of uncorporate form and are structured as limited 
partnerships or limited liability companies (LLCs). 19 A hedge fund limited 
partnership is made up of two types of partners-limited partners and the 
general partner. The limited partners provide capital as the fund's investors. 20 
Limited partner investors are not liable for the fund's debts, although they are 
subject to losing all of their investment capital and any undistributed profits. 21 
Hedge funds typically only accept capital contributions at the beginning of each 
month, and may close themselves off to new contributions if the manager 
determines that additional capital will undermine the ability of the manager to 
make profitable trades. 22 When a capital contribution is made to a hedge fund 
limited partnership, a capital account is established for the investor representing 
the investor's pro rata interest in the fund. 23 
Although limited partnership statutes permit a partnership agreement to 
Sector Committees Release Best Practices for Hedge Fund Participants, April 15, 2008, 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp927.htm; Hedge Fund Working Group, Hedge Fund Standards: 
Final Report, Jan. 2008, http://www.pellin.co.uk/HFWG/Final-Report.pdf. 
18. Other entities that constitute the core of hedge fund service providers include one or more 
prime brokers, a custodian, a fund administrator, and an auditor. See LHABIT ANT, supra note 15, at 90-
108. 
19. See generally Larry E. Ribstein, The Rise of the Uncorporation (University of Illinois Law & 
Economics Research Paper No. LE07-026 2007) (analyzing the reasons for and implications of the 
growing usage of non-corporate business forms); DOUGLAS L. HAMMER ET AL., SHARTSIS FRIESE LLP, 
U.S. REGULATION OF HEDGE FUND INVESTORS 88 (2005); LEDERMAN, supra note 17, at 
§ 2:3, 2-4. Because the differences between hedge funds structured as limited partnerships or LLCs are 
generally not important for the purposes this Article, the analysis here of limited partnerships applies 
equally to LLCs unless otherwise noted. 
20. See, e.g., Allen v. Amber Manor Apartments Partnership, 96 Ill. App. 3d 541 (1981) (holding 
that limited partnership status is obtained by making a capital contribution). 
21. See, e.g., Del. Rev. Unif. Ltd. Partnership Act§ 17-303. 
22. LEDERMAN, supra note 17, at § 2:2.4, 2-4. 
23. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 19, at 89. 
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grant voting rights to limited partners,24 in practice, hedge fund limited 
partnerships do not typically grant any voting rights to their limited partners.25 
To avoid losing their limited liability, limited partners do not participate in 
management decisions. 26 Limited partners of a hedge fund are passive 
investors whose decision making is limited to deciding when and how much 
capital to contribute or withdraw, subject to capital redemption restrictions 
under the fund's operating agreement. 27 
The general partner of a hedge fund limited partnership is the fund's 
portfolio manager and investment adviser and is responsible for managing all 
aspects of the hedge fund business, including managing the fund's investment 
portfolio. 28 Limited partnership law gives the general partner complete control 
over the activities of the partnership and the terms of the partnership 
agreement, subject only to the fiduciary duties owed to limited partners and 
whatever duties the general partner chooses to be bound by in the agreement. 29 
The fiduciary duties of general partners are to a large extent waivable in the 
limited partnership agreement. For example, the Delaware limited partnership 
statute, which seeks "to give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of 
contract," allows the partnership agreement to limit the fiduciary duties of 
general partners. 30 
Courts in Delaware and in other states interpret fiduciary duties as 
contractual in nature, such that anything short of an intentional breach of the 
partnership agreement typically will not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.31 
In particular, a hedge fund manager may negotiate different fees to be charged 
to different investors, and give different investors unique rights as to disclosure 
and other issues through "side letters," so long as such differential treatment 
does not violate investors' contractual rights or the manager's fiduciary duty to 
24. See, e.g., Del. Rev. Unif. Ltd. Partnership Act (RULPA) § l 7-302(b) (2007) (stating that "the 
partnership agreement may grant to all or certain identified limited partners or a specified class or group 
of limited the partners the right to vote separately or with all or any call or group of the limited partners 
or the general partners, on any matter"). 
25. LEDERMAN, supra note 17, at§ 2:2.1, 2-3. Partnership statutes expressly allow for a partnership 
agreement to completely eliminate any voting powers of limited partners. See, e.g., Del. RULPA 
§ 17-302(1) ("A partnership agreement may provide that any limited partner or class or group of limited 
partners shall have no voting rights."). 
26. See Del. RULPA § l 7-303(a). 
27. See infra Section l.B.2. 
28. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 19, at 89, 94; LEDERMAN, supra note 17, at §2:2.1, 2-3. For the 
purposes of this Article, the terms hedge fund "manager" and "investment adviser" are used 
interchangeably to refer to the same business entity, unless otherwise noted. 
29. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 19, at 90. 
30. Del. Code. tit. 6, § 17-1 lOl(c), (d). The equivalent provisions allowing statutory waiver for the 
member of an LLC are located in Del. Code. tit. 6, § 18-1 lOl(b)-(e). 
31. LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ENTITIES 331-32 (2d ed. 2000) (reviewing 
case law including cases holding that the general partner's competition with the partnership is not a 
breach of fiduciary duty so long as it is authorized in partnership agreement). 
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not give preferential treatment to some investors to the detriment of others. 32 
Accordingly, organizing as a limited partnership affords the hedge fund 
manager overwhelming flexibility in managing its internal affairs and carrying 
out its investment strategy. 
The general partner of a limited partnership bears unlimited liability for any 
debts the partnership itself cannot satisfy. 33 To prevent hedge fund managers 
from being subject to unlimited personal liability, the general partner of a 
hedge fund is typically a company organized as an LLC or some other limited 
liability entity such as a limited partnership or Subchapter S corporation. 34 
In addition to giving managers broad discretion and limiting the liability of 
investors and managers, organizing the fund as a limited partnership, and the 
general partner as a limited liability entity, is crucial to the fund, its investors, 
and the manager in minimizing tax burdens. As a limited partnership and LLC, 
respectively, neither the fund nor the general partner-manager would be taxed 
at the entity level. Aii income, gains, losses, and deductions "pass through" to 
the general and limited partners who report such items on their personal income 
tax returns. 35 Pass-through taxation preserves the tax treatment of the fund's 
income as it is allocated to investors. This can benefit investors because the 
favorable tax treatment given to long-term capital gains relative to ordinary 
income is passed along to them. 36 Because personal income tax is assessed on 
an annual basis, hedge fund investors incur tax liability each year in which the 
hedge fund realizes net income. 37 
B. The Hedge Fund Operating Agreement 
The wide-ranging flexibility of the law of limited partnerships, LLCs, and 
other forms of uncorporate governance serves as a virtually blank slate upon 
which hedge funds may write their operating agreements. Even more so than 
state-based corporate law, limited partnership and LLC law is "enabling," as 
opposed to mandatory, meaning that companies may choose the details of their 
own governance structures from a default set of "off-the-rack" rules provided 
by state business-entity statutes. 38 Hedge funds utilize detailed operating 
agreements to define the precise rights and duties between managers and 
32. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 19, at 90; LEDERMAN, supra note 17, at § 2:3.3[F], 2-19-20; Susan 
Ferris Wyderko, Testimony Concerning Hedge Funds Before the Subcommittee on Securities and 
Investment of the United States Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (May 16, 2006). 
33. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 17-403; HAMMER ET AL., supra note 19, at 92. 
34. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 19, at 88 n.4, at 91-92; LEDERMAN, supra note 17, at §2:3.1, 2-5. 
As control persons of the general partner entity, its owners may be personally liable for actions of the 
general partner as manager of the fund. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 19, at 92. 
35. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 19, at 88-89, 92. 
36. LEDERMAN, supra note 17, at§ 2:3.3, 2-7; HAMMER ET AL., supra note 19, at 89. 
37. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 19, at 89. 
38. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 2-3 (1991). 
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investors. 
1. Hedge Fund Manager Compensation 
Under the terms of the applicable operating agreement, the hedge fund 
management company is compensated by a management fee, typically ranging 
from 1 to 2 percent of the underlying fund's net asset value, which may be 
calculated monthly or quarterly. 39 The management fee covers expenses for 
operating and administering the fund-such as for overhead, personnel salary, 
office leases and physical capital costs. 40 Management fees are typically used 
throughout the asset management industry, including by publicly registered 
mutual funds. 41 
A distinguishing and defining feature of hedge funds, however, is that their 
operating agreements have provisions compensating managers based upon the 
performance of the funds they advise.42 Performance is typically calculated on 
an annual basis. 43 Hedge fund performance-based fees have historically ranged 
from 15 to 20 percent of profits in excess of prior losses and net of 
management fees. 44 Performance-based compensation is contractually 
structured as an income allocation to the management company contingent 
upon the fund's performance, and not as a fixed fee for services. 45 This 
compensation structure decreases the tax burden to the manager by preserving 
the tax character of capital gains realized by the fund. As a result, the fund is 
not required to convert income from capital gains to ordinary income, which is 
taxed at a higher rate. 46 
Hedge funds' performance fees are limited by two types of contractual 
provisions, each requiring a threshold level of investment returns before any 
performance-based compensation is allocated to the manager. The more 
common provision is called a "high-water mark." A high-water mark limits the 
performance fee allocation to positive gains above the amount of the investor's 
capital contribution. 47 A high-water mark requires any losses from previous 
years to be recouped first, meaning that an investor must actually receive a net 
positive return on their investment before a manager is paid a performance 
39. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 19, at 327; LEDERMAN, supra note 17, at§ 2:3.3[AJ, 2-8. 
40. LEDERMAN, supra note 17, at§ 2:3.3[AJ, 2-8. 
41. Securities and Exchange Commission, Invest Wisely: An Introduction to Mutual Funds (August 
8, 2007). 
42. See LHABITANT,supra note 15, at 30. 
43. LEDERMAN, supra note 17, at§ 2:2.3. 
44. JAMES R. BARTH ET AL., HEDGE FUNDS: RISKS AND RETURNS IN GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS, 
MILKEN INSTITUTE 32-33 (December 2006); LEDERMAN, supra note 17, at§ 2:3.3[CJ, 2-10. 
45. LEDERMAN, supra note 17, at § 2:3.3[C], 2-10. 
46. Id. (noting that capital gains are characterized as a "guaranteed payment" when allocated to the 
manager). 
47. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 19, at 329-330; LEDERMAN, supra note 17, at§ 2:3.3[CJ[l J, 2-11. 
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fee. 48 A "hurdle rate" is another compensation prov1s10n utilized by hedge 
funds, typically in conjunction with a high-water mark. A performance fee 
subject to a hurdle rate will not be allocated to the manager unless a minimum 
rate of return is achieved. 49 Particular hurdles may be calculated annually or on 
a cumulative basis, and may be fixed at an absolute rate or depend on some 
other rate or performance benchmark. 50 
In addition to earning compensation from performance fees, hedge fund 
manager compensation may also be derived from the manager's own 
investment in the fund. Managers often co-invest a significant portion of their 
own capital directly in the underlying funds they manage. 51 Using a 
comprehensive database of hedge funds from 1994 to 2002, several financial 
economists estimated that the average investment by managers accounted for 
7 .1 percent of fund assets, with the median manager owning 2.4 percent of the 
fund. 52 Hedge fund investors often desire co-investment by managers to align 
h ' . . . J 1 • 53 t 1e manager s mcentives wit 1 t11eir own. 
2. Restrictions on Share Liquidity 
Investors' financial rights in a limited partnership are overwhelmingly 
determined by contract. 54 Limited partnership law generally leaves it to the 
operating agreement to determine when and under what circumstances a limited 
partner is entitled to a distribution of capital. It also permits limited partners to 
transfer their economic interests in the firm (e.g., rights to profits, losses, and 
distributions) but not their voting or management rights or powers. 55 In 
practice, hedge funds place significant restrictions on the ability of investors to 
redeem their shares with the fund and to resell or otherwise transfer their 
shares. 56 
Operating agreements also generally restrict investors' ability to withdraw 
capital on a periodic basis (ranging from monthly to quarterly to annually)57 
48. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 19, at 329; LEDERMAN supra note 17, at§ 2:3.3(C]( 1], 2-11. 
49. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 19, at 330-31; LEDERMAN, supra note 17, at§ 2:3.3(C](2], 2-12. 
50. Id .. 
51. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 19, at 92; LEDERMAN, supra note 17, at§ 2:2.2, 2-3. 
52. Vikas Agarwal et al., Role of Managerial Incentives and Discretion in Hedge Fund 
Performance, J. FIN. 6, 40 tabl. I (forthcoming), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=889008. See also 
European Central Bank, Financial Stability Review 50, Chart 1.41 (June 2008) (finding that 35 percent 
of hedge funds had the personal capital of their manager directly invested in the fund), 
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/financialstabilityreview200806en.pdf. 
53. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HEDGE FUNDS: REGULATORS AND MARKET 
PARTICIPANTS ARE TAKING STEPS TO STRENGTHEN MARKET DISCIPLINE, BUT CONTINUED ATTENTION 
IS NEEDED GA0-08-200, 11 (2008). 
54. RIBSTEIN, supra note 31, at 294. 
55. Del. Code Ann. tit.6 § l 7-702(a). 
56. Share resale restrictions are generally required for a hedge fund make a private offering under 
federal law. See infra Section l.D. l. 
57. LEDERMAN, supra note 17, at§ 2:2.4, 2-4; HAMMER ET AL., supra note I 9, at 3. By comparison, 
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and may permit the manager to bar withdrawals at its discretion. 58 In addition, 
investors must typically give 30 to 90 days' notice before being able to 
withdraw capital. 59 Hedge funds may also implement a "lock-up" period that 
prohibits a capital contribution from being withdrawn after it is first invested in 
the fund. 60 Lock-up periods are typically less than one quarter, but may be as 
long as two years. 61 Finally, hedge funds may also use a "gate" to limit how 
much capital can be withdrawn on a given date, which is usually based upon a 
fraction of the net asset value of the fund. 62 
Hedge funds limit the liquidity of their shares for several reasons. First, 
limitations on liquidity may benefit the fund in the long run because capital 
redemptions at a given point in time may be disruptive to the fund's operations 
and inconsistent with the fund's investment objectives or trading strategy.63 
Second, restrictions on the resale of hedge fund shares are required for a hedge 
fund to qualify for certain exemptions under federal law relating to raising 
capital. 64 Third, hedge funds place restrictions on the trading of their shares so 
as to not be deemed a publicly traded partnership with its associated higher tax 
burden.65 
C. Investment Company and Investment Adviser Law 
Because a hedge fund consists of an investment fund and an investment 
adviser, its activities fall within the scope of federal regulation under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 (the "Company Act") and the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 (the "Advisers Act"). 66 All hedge fund managers are 
subject to some provisions of the Advisers Act, and registered hedge fund 
advisers are subject to the full scope of the Advisers Act. By definition, 
however, hedge funds are completely excluded from any provision of the 
Company Act. 
publicly registered mutual funds are required to redeem shares to investors daily. Company Act Rule 
22c-l(b), 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-l(b) (2007) (requiring registered investment companies to calculate net 
asset value at least daily). 
58. See LHABITANT, supra note 15, at 29. 
59. LEDERMAN, supra note 17, at§ 2:3.3[D][3], 2-16. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at§ 2:3.3, 2-16-17. BARTH ET AL., supra note 44, at 38-41 (showing that a majority of hedge 
funds have a lock-up period of less than one quarter). 
62. LEDERMAN, supra note 17, at§ 2:3.3[D][3][b], 2-16. 
63. See infra Section 11.B.2. 
64. See infra Section l.D. I. 
65. LEDERMAN, supra note 17, at§ 2:3.3[D][2] at 2-15. 
66. Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, ch. 686, title I, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as 
amended at 15 U .S.C. §§ 80a-1-80a-64); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, ch. 686, 
title II, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-l-80b-21). 
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1. Investment Company Law 
The Company Act was passed in the wake of the stock market crash of 
1929 and government allegations of pervasive self-dealing and investor abuse 
in the investment fund industry.67 The Company Act requires registration by all 
investment companies, defined as any issuer that, among other things, "is or 
holds itself out as being engaged primarily ... in the business of investing, 
reinvesting, or trading securities."68 A registered investment company is 
subject to wide-ranging and detailed regulation intended to ensure that 
unsophisticated investors are able to make informed investment choices and to 
prevent fund sponsors from acting opportunistically at the expense of 
investors. 69 
The investment activities of hedge funds would deem them an "investment 
company" under the Company Act; however, the funds operate so as to qualify 
for at least one of two exclusions from the definition of an investment 
company. Under section 3(c)(l) of the Company Act, hedge funds are excluded 
from the definition of investment company so long as they have no more than 
l 00 investors and sell their securities only through a private sale. 70 Under 
section 3(c)(7) of the Company Act, hedge funds are excluded from the 
definition of investment company so long as they only sell securities to 
"qualified purchasers" through a private sale. 71 Qualified purchasers include 
both natural persons owning at least $5 million in investments and certain 
companies with at least $ l 00 million in securities investments. 72 Section 
3(c)(7) allows hedge funds to sell their securities to an unlimited number of 
67. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE ECONOMICS OF MUTUAL FUND MARKETS: COMPETITION 
VERSUS REGULATION 48-54 (1990); Celebration of the 60th Anniversary of the Investment Company 
Act Opening Remarks by Paul Roye Director, Division of Investment Management U.S. Securities & 
Exchange Commission (Oct. 4, 2000), available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/spch405.htm. 
68. Company Act§ 3(a)(l),15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(I) (2006). 
69. See Company Act § l(b)(I), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b)(I); Form N-IA Items 14-15, 10, 5, 3 
(requiring disclosure of information including contact information of the fund's investment advisers and 
portfolio managers, the history of the fund, its risk/return profile and investment objectives, the fund's 
organization, and how the fees it charges to investors are calculated). Registered investment companies 
must also quarterly disclose portfolio holdings to the SEC and semiannually to investors. Company Act 
§§ 30(a), 30(b); Company Act Rule 30bl-I, 17 C.F.R. §270.30bl-1; Company Act Rule 30bl-5, 17 
C.F.R. §270.30bl-5; Company Act§ 30(e); Company Act Rule 30e-l, 17 C.F.R. §270.30e-I. Open-end 
registered investment companies must also daily calculate net asset value and allow investors to redeem 
shares within 7 days at that value. Company Act§ 22(e); Company Act Rule 22c-l(a), 17 C.F.R. § 
270.22c-l(a) (1993) (requiring registered investment companies to sell, redeem, or repurchase shares at 
net asset value); Company Act Rule 22c-l(b), 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-l(b) (1993) (requiring registered 
investment companies to calculate net asset value at least daily). 
70. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(l). 
71. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7). Nonpublic offerings for the purposes of being exempted from the 
Company Act are generally interpreted to be the same as those as under section 4(2) of the Securities 
Act. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 12 n.36. 
72. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(5 l )(A)(i); I 7 C.F.R. § 270.2a5 l-I (g)(2) (1997); LEDERMAN, supra note 
17, at § 5: 1.2 (explaining that qualified institutional buyers under Rule 144A of the Securities Act 
generally meet the definition of qualified purchaser). 
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qualified purchaser investors without falling under the definition of an 
investment company; however, sales must be limited to 499 investors to avoid 
registration under the Securities and Exchange Act. 
Because hedge funds are excluded from the Company Act, the funds are not 
subject to the investment activity restrictions imposed upon registered 
investment companies by the Company Act and its regulations. 73 For example, 
to use leverage in the form of borrowing bank funds, a registered investment 
company must cover the debt by retaining assets equivalent to at least 300 
percent of the borrowings. 74 In addition, under the Company Act an investment 
company that engages in a short sale or certain derivatives transactions must 
effectively hedge the investment position with an offsetting trade or hold liquid 
securities of an equivalent value in a segregated account. 75 Particular hedge 
funds may not utilize each of these trading activities. For instance, a substantial 
portion of hedge funds utilize little to no leverage. 76 Nonetheless, exclusion 
from Company Act investment restrictions is essential to the hedge fund 
business model and facilitates the undertaking of investment strategies which 
are relatively less exposed to market risk. 77 
The Company Act also imposes additional restrictions on the most widely 
utilized type of registered investment company-"mutual funds." 78 Mutual 
funds are prohibited from investing greater than 15 percent of the net value of 
73. See generally Audrey Talley & James L. Love, Restrictions on Investments, in MUTUAL FUND 
REGULATION, Chapter 8 (2d ed. Clifford E. Kirsch 2007). 
74. Company Act § 18(c) (debt restriction for closed-end investment companies), § 18(t) (debt 
restriction for open-end investment companies). 
75. Emerald Management Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 21, 1978); LEDERMAN, supra note 17, 
at § 5:2.7, 5-28-29; Talley & Love, supra note 73 at §§ 3:3. I [B][3], 3-7-3-11. Although the SEC has 
authority under Section 12(a) of the Company Act to prohibit registered investment companies from 
undertaking short sales or purchasing securities on the "margin" (which is a form of borrowing), it has 
not exercised that authority. 
76. Leverage measures the extent to which an investor's returns are magnified through borrowing 
or some other means such as the utilization of derivatives. Although hedge funds are often mistakenly 
viewed as highly leveraged institutions, only a small portion of the industry is highly leveraged. See 
Roger Merritt & Eileen Fahey, FitchRatings, Credit Policy, Hedge Funds: The Credit Market's New 
Paradigm 4 (June 5, 2007) (estimating leverage for different types of credit strategy hedge funds). In 
general, hedge fund leverage has steadily and substantially decreased since 1998. From 1998 to 2004, 
researchers at the Bank for International Settlements estimated that average hedge fund leverage 
dropped from about 8 times assets to 3 times assets. See Patrick McGuire et al., Time-varying Exposures 
and leverage in Hedge Funds, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW 69 March 2005. The Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimated that in 2007 average gross hedge fund 
leverage was 3.9 to I, which means that for every 3.9 dollars in hedge fund assets, one dollar was equity 
and the rest was borrowed (or the economic equivalent of borrowing was achieved by using derivatives). 
Adrian Blundell-Wignall, An Overview of Hedge Funds and Structured Products: Issues in leverage 
and Risk, FIN. MARKETS TRENDS 48 (2007). See also generally Patrick McGuire & Kostas Tsatsaronis, 
Estimating Hedge Fund Leverage, BIS Working Papers, September 2008. Other estimates of hedge fund 
leverage have found similarly low measures. See International Monetary Fund (IMF), Global Financial 
Stability Report Financial Stress and Deleveraging Macro-Financial Implications and Policy 41, Box 1.5 
(October 2008); European Central Bank, Financial Stability Review 45, Chart 1.32 December 2008. 
77. See infra Section II.A. 
78. For a fuller discussion of registered investment companies, see infra notes 182-189 and 
accompanying text. 
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their assets in illiquid securities, including the privately placed securities issued 
by hedge funds. 79 Mutual funds also may not utilize lock-ups because open-end 
investment companies must return capital to investors within seven days of a 
redemption request. 8° Furthermore, mutual funds typically have relatively 
narrowly defined investment strategies and lack the flexibility to quickly adapt 
their strategies to changing market conditions because deviating from an 
investment policy deemed "fundamental" requires shareholder approval. 81 In 
addition, mutual funds holding themselves out as "diversified" funds are 
prohibited, with respect to 75 percent of their assets, from holding more than 10 
percent of the voting securities of any single issuer, or having the securities of 
an issuer constitute more than 5 percent of the mutual fund's net asset value.82 
2. Investment Adviser Law 
Hedge fund managers meet the definition of "investment adviser" under the 
Advisers Act, which is defined as any person in the business of advising others 
about whether to purchase or sell certain securities. 83 An adviser must register 
under the Advisers Act if it holds its services out to the public as an investment 
adviser, advises an investment company registered under the Company Act, or 
advises 15 or more clients. 84 However, a hedge fund manager may gain 
exemption from the Advisers Act by qualifying as a private adviser under 
section 203(b)(3), which requires that the manager has not advised more than 
15 clients in the previous 12 months (which in practice may include up to 15 
separate funds with several hundred investors each), does not hold itself out to 
the public, and does not advise a registered investment company. 85 To 
purportedly enable regulators to more effectively address investor protection 
and systemic risk concerns relating to hedge funds, the foregoing adviser 
registration rules are likely to be modified by the l l l th Congress in a way that 
79. Investment Company Act Rel. No. 18,612. The SEC defines "illiquid" securities as those that 
cannot be sold at or near their net asset value within seven days. Acquisition and Valuation of Certain 
Portfolio Instruments by Registered Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Rel. No. 14,983, 
51 Fed. Reg. 9,773 (Mar. 12, 1986); Investment Company Act Rel. No. 5,947, 35 Fed. Reg. 19,989 (Oct. 
21, 1969). 
80. Company Act§ 22(e). 
81. 15 U.S.C. § 8-a-13(a)( I )-(4); Talley & Love, supra note 79 at § 8.2. I (BJ; LEDERMAN, supra 
note 17, at§ 5:2.7, 5-27. 
82. Company Act§ 5(b)(I). To minimize their tax liability, mutual funds must also comply with 
the diversification rule of the Internal Revenue Code, which requires mutual funds to meet the same 
diversification rule with respect to 50 percent of its assets. See Internal Revenue Code 
§ 851 (b )(3). 
83. Advisers Act§ 202(a)( 11 ), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l I) (2006). 
84. Advisers Act §§ 203(b )(3). Each individual fund is a "client" for Advisers Act purposes, not 
each investor in the advised fund. Advisers Act§ 203(b)(3). 
85. 17 C.F.R. § 275.203A-l(a); Advisers Act § 203(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3). A "client" 
includes a legal organization, thereby allowing hedge fund managers to count each separate fund as a 
client, and not each separate investor in each fund. 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-I (a) (2004). 
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would require most hedge fund managers to register under the Advisers Act. 86 
Both registered and unregistered advisers are subject to the provisions of 
the Advisers Act prohibiting material misstatements, misleading omissions, and 
other fraudulent practices to investors or prospective investors. 87 The Advisers 
Act prohibits any fund manager from making false or misleading statements 
regarding investment strategies, experience and credentials, risks associated 
with the fund, or valuation of the fund's assets. 88 Under the Advisers Act, 
fraudulent or misleading statements or omissions need not be willful to be 
unlawful; negligence is sufficient for liability. 89 In addition, registered 
managers must disclose basic information about the manager on Form ADV, 
either to investors or the SEC. 90 This includes information about its investment 
strategies,91 along with material facts about the financial condition of the 
management company. 92 
Unregistered managers are not subject to any limitations on charging 
performance fees. 93 By contrast, a fund manager registered as an investment 
adviser is generally prohibited from charging a performance fee to clients based 
solely upon the client's capital gains (i.e., the fund's profits). 94 However, a 
registered adviser may charge a profit-based performance fee if advising a fund 
which is excluded from the Company Act under section 3(c)(7),95 or if all 
investors in the fund meet the definition of a "qualified client."96 A qualified 
client includes natural persons and companies having at least $1.5 million in 
net worth or at least $750,000 managed by the adviser. 97 In addition, a 
registered adviser is permitted to charge a performance fee if the fee 
symmetrically increases or decreases in proportion to the performance of the 
fund averaged over a specified period or relative to an external benchmark of 
performance. 98 Symmetric performance-based fees, also known as "fulcrum 
fees," are only utilized by approximately 2 percent of U.S. mutual funds, in part 
due to accepted commercial practice as well as the incentives fulcrum fees 
86. See, e.g., Press Release, United States Treasury Department, Fact Sheet: Administration's 
Regulatory Reform Agenda Moves Forward: Legislation for the Registration of Hedge Funds Delivered 
to Capitol Hill (July 14, 2009), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg214.htm. 
87. Advisers Act§ 206(4)-(8), 15 U.S.C. § 275.206(4)-(8). 
88. Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. 44756, 
44759 (Aug. 9, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275). 
89. Id. at 44,759-60 (noting that negligent misstatements are prohibited under the Advisers Act). 
90. Form ADV is required under Advisers Act Rule 204-3(a), 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-3(a) (1994). 
91. Form ADV, Part II, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formadv.pdf. 
92. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-4(a)(l)-(2). 
93. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 19, at 333. 
94. Advisers Act§ 205(a)(I), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(I) (2006) (prohibiting a registered adviser from 
being paid compensation "on the basis of a share of capital gains upon or capital appreciation of the 
funds or any portion of the funds of the client"). 
95. Advisers Act§ 205(b)(4); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(b)(4). 
96. Advisers Act Rule 205-3(d)( I), 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(d)(l ). 
97. Id. 
98. Advisers Act§ 205(b)(l)-(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(b)(l)-(2). 
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create for investors to exit early or to not join well-performing funds. 99 
D. Securities Regulation 
Hedge funds fall within the orbit of federal securities regulation for two 
primary reasons. First, hedge funds raise investment capital by issuing limited 
partnership or LLC-member interests, which are considered "securities" under 
the federal securities laws. 100 Second, as purchasers and sellers of the securities 
of U.S.-based public companies, hedge funds must comply with various 
obligations arising in connection with securities trading. 
I. Raising Investment Capital 
In raising capital from limited partner-investors, hedge funds act both as 
issuers and sellers of securities that utilize interstate commerce, and are 
therefore subject to the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act and the 
Exchange Act. 101 These statutes prohibit specific material misstatements, 
fraudulent conduct more generally, and material omissions. Under section 17(a) 
of the Securities Act, it is unlawful for an issuer to make any untrue statement 
of material fact or to omit any fact so that a statement that was made is 
misleading. 102 Under section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 of the Exchange Act, 
material omissions in connection with the sale of any security are likewise 
prohibited. 103 Under Rule lOb-5, hedge fund managers are also liable for 
utilizing material nonpublic information to purchase or sell securities in 
violation of a fiduciary duty-i.e., for insider trading. 104 In addition, under 
various provisions of the Exchange Act and Securities Act, hedge funds are 
prohibited from manipulating the prices of publicly or privately held 
securities. 105 
Despite being subject to fraud liability, hedge funds raise capital so as not 
to be subject to the registration and disclosure obligations typically required of 
99. Sophia Grene, A Cautious Embrace of Performance Fees, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2008; Marcel 
Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. 
PENN. L. REV. 1021, 1050 (2006-2007). 
100. Exchange Act Rule 3a 11-1 ("The term equity security is hereby defined to include any ... 
limited partnership interest"); Securities and Exchange Commission v. Parkersburg Wireless Limited 
Liability Company, 991 F. Supp. 6 (D. D .C. 1997) (holding that LLC interests are "securities" under the 
Securities Act and Exchange Act). 
10 I. Notwithstanding that hedge funds privately raise capital in reliance upon Securities Act 
Regulation D, such an offering is fully subject to the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act. 
Regulation D Preliminary Note 1, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2007); Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth et al., 
471U.S.681, 692 (1985). 
102. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (applying its provisions to any "offer or sale of any security"). 
103. Exchange Act § lO(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j; Rule !Ob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (2007). 
Furthermore, under the Securities Act mere negligence is sufficient to be liable for fraud. Aaron v. SEC, 
446 U.S. 680, 701-02 (1980). 
104. LEDERMAN, supra note 17, at§ 8:3.3. 
105. LARRY D. SODERQUIST, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAWS§ 14:5 (4th ed. 2004). 
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companies making a public offering of securities. The Securities Act requires 
all companies publicly raising capital to register with the SEC and disclose 
information to investors. 106 Section 5 of the Securities Act requires all 
interstate issuers of securities to file a registration statement. ' 07 Registration 
statements generally include a prospectus to be delivered to investors before or 
accompanying a sale. '08 A prospectus contains information such as a 
description of the issuer's business, the particular securities being offered, 
important risk factors affecting the issuer, financial statements, and numerous 
items relating to the issuer's financial condition. 109 
Hedge funds make offerings of securities under the constraints of two 
exemptions from the registration and disclosure requirements of the Securities 
Act, which are widely referred to as "private placements" or "private 
offerings." 11° First, section 4(2) of the Securities Act specifically exempts 
nonpublic offerings of securities by an issuer from the requirements of section 
5. 111 As developed by case law following the U.S. Supreme Court case of SEC 
v. Ralston Purina Co., an offering will be deemed private if potential investors 
have access to the same kind of information available in a registration 
statement, are financially sophisticated, have the ability to bear economic risk, 
and perhaps other factors. 112 To qualify for a statutory private offering pursuant 
to section 4(2) of the Securities Act, a fund must provide potential investors 
with access to the same type of information as would be provided in a 
registration filed pursuant to section 5 of the Securities Act. 113 
Second, hedge funds also issue securities under Rule 506 of Regulation D 
of the Securities Act (Rule 506). Rule 506 requires funds to limit their investor 
base almost exclusively to accredited investors 114 (although it does not limit the 
106. Securities Act§ 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2006). 
107. Securities Act§ 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006). 
108. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 19, at 145, 157 (describing the components of disclosure for 
registration statement on Form N-1 A and Form S-1 ). 
109. See, e.g., Form S-1, Part I. Form S-1 is the general form to be used by issuers of standard U.S. 
securities. 
110. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 14. 
111. Securities Act § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2006) (exempting from Section 5 of the Securities 
Act any "transaction not involving a public offering"). 
112. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125-26 (1953); HAMMER ET AL., supra note 19, at 
116-20. Other factors include whether the offering is personally made to potential investors, raises a low 
amount of capital, and involves a small group of offerees and a limited number of shares. Id. 
113. 346 U.S. at 125-26. 
114. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. Rule 506 does, however, allow sale to no more than 35 nonaccredited 
investors that are financially sophisticated, which is defined as an investor that, either alone or with the 
assistance of a purchaser representative, possesses "such knowledge and experience in financial and 
business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment." 
Regulation D Rule 506(b )(2)(ii), 17 C.F .R. § 230.50 l (b )(2)(ii). It should be noted that although Rule 
506(b)(2)(i) limits the number of "purchasers" allowed to 35, that limitation has no effect because 
accredited investors are not included in the definition of "purchaser" under Regulation D. 17 C.F.R. § 
230.50 l (e)(l )(iv). 
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number of investors a hedge fund may have). 115 Accredited investors include 
certain companies with at least $5,000,000 in assets and natural persons whose 
net worth (or whose joint net worth with a spouse) exceeds $1,000,000 or that 
have an annual income for the last two years of at least $200,000 (or $300,000 
in joint spousal income if married). 116 To qualify for an exemption pursuant to 
Rule 506, a hedge fund is also prohibited from offering or selling its securities 
using "general solicitation or general advertising." 117 Rule 502(c) of Regulation 
D lists any advertising in print or broadcast media, and any invitation to a 
seminar or meeting by such methods, as constituting general solicitation or 
advertising. 118 Hedge funds seeking the safe harbor provision of Rule 506 must 
also exercise reasonable care to prevent the resale of their securities. 119 
Securities purchased pursuant to a Rule 506 private placement cannot be resold 
by the purchaser without registration or qualification for another exemption 
from registration. 120 
When an offering is made pursuant to Ruie 506, the offering is deemed in 
accordance with section 4(2) and hence exempt from the registration 
requirements of section 5 of the Securities Act. 121 Nonetheless, to avoid the 
liability involved with making a private placement, hedge funds usually make 
offerings that would satisfy the requirements of Rule 506 and the judicially-
defined statutory section 4(2) exemption. 122 
115. As far as legal considerations are concerned, hedge funds limit the number of their investors to 
comply with the section 3(c)(I) "investment company" exclusion under the Investment Company Act 
and/or to avoid mandatory registration and reporting under the Securities Act and Exchange Act. 
116. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a). The SEC on December 27, 2006, proposed new rules to introduce a 
higher accredited investor requirement applicable to hedge fund investors and revised other aspects of 
Regulation D. See 72 Fed. Reg., supra note 1, at 403-05 (requiring that an investor in a fund exempt 
under section 3(c)(l) of the Company Act be an "accredited natural person" owning at least $2.5 million 
in investable assets); Revisions of Limited Offering Exceptions in Regulation D, 72 Fed. Reg. 45116 
(August 10, 2007). The proposed rules were never finalized. 
117. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(l). 
118. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c). In In re CG/ Capital Inc., the SEC found that a broker-dealer made a 
general solicitation when it sent out a mass email about privately raising capital for an internet startup 
without first verifying whether the potential investors were accredited or otherwise sophisticated. In re 
CG/ Capital Inc., Securities Act Rel. No. 7, 904 (Sept. 29, 2000). 
119. Id. Exercising reasonable care to prevent resale is meant to "assure that the purchasers of the 
securities are not underwriters within the meaning of section 2(a)(l I) of the (Securities] Act." Id. 
120. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) (1997). 
121. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a) (2008) ("Offers and sales of securities by an issuer that satisfy the 
conditions in paragraph (b) of this Rule 506 shall be deemed to be a transaction not involving any public 
offering within the meaning of Section 4(2) of the [Securities] Act."). 
122. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 19, at 120 ("Hedge funds typically rely on the safe harbor of 
Regulation D Rule 506 ... in addition to relying on the statutory section 4(2) exemption, in offering and 
selling their interests."); LEDERMAN, supra note l 7, at § 4:2. l (noting that hedge funds typically raise 
capital "pursuant to a private placement exempted from registration under section 4(2) of the Securities 
Act and Rule 506 of Regulation D"). See also LARRY D. SODERQUIST & THERESA A. GABALDON, 
SECURITIES LAW 73 (1998) (noting the importance of the section 4(2) private placement exemption even 
in light of Rule 506 because, among other reasons, it minimizes liability for making an unregistered 
public offering). 
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2. Disclosures Relating to Trading Registered Securities 
Hedge funds must comply with various requirements under the Exchange 
Act arising out of their investments in public companies. 123 First, all hedge 
funds and their managers are required to disclose large shareholdings of public 
companies. To regulate the market for control of public companies, sections 
13( d) and 13(g) require that hedge funds or their advisers must disclose 
beneficial ownership of greater than 5 percent in a class of voting shares of 
securities registered under the Exchange Act, and disclose whether the purpose 
of such ownership is to acquire or influence the issuer. 124 In connection with 
preventing insider trading, section l 6(a) requires that hedge funds, upon 
acquiring a l 0 percent ownership stake in any issuer's class of voting equity 
securities registered pursuant to the Exchange Act, must disclose such 
ownership, any other equity ownership in the company, and any subsequent 
changes in such ownership. 125 In addition, to increase publicly available 
knowledge about institutional shareholdings, under section l 3(t) hedge funds 
owning more than $100 million in stock traded on a national exchange are 
required to quarterly disclose to the public all of their equity holdings and to 
weekly disclose to the SEC certain short sale positions. 126 
E. Hedge Funds Versus Corporate Governance 
Hedge fund governance structures are quite different from those applicable 
to registered investment companies and public companies more generally. The 
particular governance devices adopted by hedge funds are explicable, in part, 
by the transaction cost theory of the firm, according to which companies adopt 
governance structures aligned with transaction-specific characteristics to reduce 
transaction costs and increase performance, 127 which in the case of hedge funds 
is measured by investment returns. A major source of hedge fund transaction 
costs stems from managers, to whom investors delegate investment decision-
making power, unduly consuming investor wealth, taking on too much risk, or 
123. Hedge funds also typically do not need to register as broker-dealers under the Exchange Act. 
SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 18. 
124. Exchange Act§ 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d); Exchange Act§ 13(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(g); 17 
C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(a) (2007). 
125. Exchange Act§ 16(a)(3)(B); 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-l; 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2 (2007). 
126. Exchange Act Rule 13f-l(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-l(b) (2007); U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Disclosure of Short Sales and Short Positions by Institutional Investment Managers, 73 
Fed. Reg. 61678, Oct. 17, 2008. 
127. Oliver E. Williamson, Strategizing, Economizing, and Economic Organization, 12 STRAT. 
MGMT. J. 75, 79 (1991) (identifying the main task of the transaction cost theory of the firm as 
"align[ing] transactions, which differ in their attributes, with governance structures, which differ in their 
costs and competencies, in a discriminating (mainly, transaction cost economizing) way"); Robert J. 
David & Shin-Kap Han, A Systematic Assessment of the Empirical Support for Transaction Cost 
Economics, 25 STRAT. MGMT. J. 39, 40 (2004) (noting that the central claim of the transaction cost 
economics is "that transactions will be handled in such a way as to minimize the costs involved in 
carrying them out"). 
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failing to take on enough risk to sufficiently engage in activities such as 
innovation. 128 A primary task of organizational law and contracting is thus to 
reduce these types of agency costs by aligning incentives. 129 
Public corporations limit agency costs through the market for corporate 
control, monitoring by an independent board of directors and activist 
shareholders, granting employee stock options, and other mechanisms. 130 
Registered investment companies must also have a board of directors, 40 
percent of whom are independent. 131 By contrast, hedge funds do not have a 
corporate-style, independent board of directors that plays any significant role in 
the manager's investment decision making. 132 Additionally, because hedge 
fund limited partners cannot freely transfer their control (voting) rights and 
there is a very limited secondary market for hedge fund shares, hedge fund 
managers are insulated from the market for corporate control. 133 Hedge fund 
management thus takes place in a relatively flat organizational structure and 
without investment decisions being subject to outside monitoring and influence 
by non-managers. 
Hedge funds do, however, employ governance mechanisms to resolve 
agency problems so investors can "assure themselves of getting a return on 
their investment." 134 Unlike public corporations, ownership and management in 
a hedge fund are not fundamentally separated. 135 Hedge funds are generally 
"owner-operated" and managers often have a substantial ownership stake in the 
underlying funds that they advise. 136 In addition, whereas the compensation of 
corporate managers is comprised of a large fixed salary and pension not 
128. See generally Sanford Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of the Principal-Agent 
Problem, 51 ECONOMETRICA 7 (1983); Speech, Chester S. Spat!, Chief Economist and Director, Office 
of Economic Analysis U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Conflicts of Interest in Asset 
Management, May 12, 2005; Houman B. Shadab, Innovation and Corporate Governance: The Impact of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, 10 U. PENN. J. Bus. & EMP. L. 955, 978-79 (2008) (discussing agency costs from a 
failure to innovate). 
129. Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980); 
Romano, Corporate law and Corporate Governance, 5 INDUSTRIAL AND CORPORATE CHANGE 277, 
277-78 (1996) ("The fundamental task of corporate law is to provide a framework of governance 
institutions that mitigate the agency problem"); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of 
Corporate Governance, 52 J. Fin. 737, 737 (1997) ("Corporate governance deals with the ways in which 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment."). See also 
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). 
130. See generally Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 129. 
131. Company Act§ !O(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-IO(a) (2006). 
132. See LHABITANT,supra note 15, at 92 (questioning the role of hedge fund directors). 
133. M. Corey Goldman, Mutiny? Good luck, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR MAGAZINE, Feb. 24, 
2009 (reporting that hedge fund boards typically are not involved in monitoring management and that 
"the fine print in a hedge fund charter usually makes it almost impossible" for investors to replace 
directors or otherwise influence management decisions). See also Ribstein, supra note 19, at 19. 
134. Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 129, at 737 (surveying and defining corporate governance 
issues from a "straightforward agency perspective"). 
135. Ribstein, supra note I 9, at 8. 
136. See supra notes 51-52. 
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directly dependent upon the manager's contribution to company 
performance, 137 the fixed portion of hedge fund manager compensation (the 1 
to 2 percent management fee) is relatively small compared to what hedge fund 
managers could earn through performance fees tied directly to producing gains 
for investors. 138 Although hedge funds place short-term limitations on investor 
redemptions, relative underperformance will lead investors to redeem their 
capital and may even cause a forced liquidation of the fund. 139 Performance-
based compensation and co-investment, limited partner liquidation rights, and 
the need to return to investors to raise capital serve as substitute governance 
mechanisms for the strong voting rights and share transferability found in 
public companies. 140 
II. FINANCIAL INNOVATION, MARKET RISK, AND HEDGE FUND GOVERNANCE 
Financial innovation can further the overall purposes of the financial 
system by decreasing investment risk and reducing the transaction costs 
associated with investing. Hedge funds innovate by implementing novel 
investment strategies that decrease market risk for their investors. The legal 
regime applicable to hedge funds facilitates their innovation activities in two 
ways: the lack of federal restrictions on hedge fund investment activities 
enables the funds to innovate, and the uncorporate governance of the funds 
provides high-powered incentives to do so. 
A. Hedge Fund Innovation 
Innovation is a process that entails the commercialization of a new idea and 
results in something new and valuable to consumers or producers. 141 A 
137. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Executive Pensions, 30 J. CORP. L. 823, 850 
tab I. 8 (2005) (finding that the mean base salary plus pension was 38.6 percent of the total compensation 
for S&P 500 CEOs that left the company during 2003 and the first five months of2004). 
138. See Ribstein, supra note 19, at 4. 
139. See infra Part 11.B.3 for a fuller discussion of hedge funds' need to continually return to 
investors for capital. 
140. See Ribstein, supra note 19, at 12, 15. For a somewhat parallel comparison of private equity 
and corporate governance see Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity Create 
Wealth?, The Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate Governance, U. CHICAGO L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2009). 
141. Jan Fagerberg, Innovation: A Guide to the Literature, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON 
INNOVATION 4 (JAN FAGERBERG, DAVID C. MOWERY & RICHARD R. NELSON EDS. 2005) ("Invention is 
the first occurrence of an idea for a new product or process, while innovation is the first attempt to carry 
it out in practice.") [hereinafter HANDBOOK ON INNOVATION]; Elspeth McFadzean, Andrew O'Loughlin 
& Elizabeth Shaw, Corporate Entrepreneurship and Innovation Part 2: A Role- and Processed-Based 
Approach, 8 EUR. J. INNOVATION MGMT. 393, 395 (2005) (innovation involves an idea discovery phase 
and a commercialization phase); CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, MARKET STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION 3 
(Mario Calderini, Paola Garrone & Maurizio Sobrero eds. 2003) (innovation begins "with the generation 
of new knowledge targeted to the discovery of new products and processes, and ending with their 
commercial exploitation"); MARY O'SULLIVAN, CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL: CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY 12 (innovation 
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fundamental goal of the financial system is to facilitate investment activities by 
matching up investors seeking positive returns on their capital with firms 
seeking to raise financial capital, 142 and financial innovation can further this 
goal. For example, innovation can decrease investment risk by increasing the 
range of available investment opportunities or the quality of information about 
the potential risks and rewards of a particular investment. In addition, more 
investment activities can be undertaken when innovation reduces transaction 
costs. Investment transaction costs include the cost of not being able to quickly 
exit an investment (illiquidity) and the cost of paying fees to third-party asset 
managers. 143 
Hedge funds innovate by creating new and often complex investment 
strategies that may build upon innovations in financial instruments and 
financial production methods (financial engineering). These innovative 
strategies have resulted in hedge funds taking a leading role in a wide range of 
specific industries and market niches, including wealher derivatives and film 
finance. 144 Although hedge fund innovation may come at the expense of 
increasing investment transaction costs and investors' exposures to hedge fund-
specific risks, the net impact of such innovation is generally to reduce 
exposures to market risk and specific systematic market risk factors, thereby 
helping to diversify an investment portfolio. 
1. investing and Diversification 
Investors benefit from receiving the highest returns on the capital they 
invest. One source of higher investment returns is the skill of an asset manager 
in implementing investment strategies. Managerial skill is typically measured 
and represented by the quantity alpha (a). Another source of higher returns is 
higher risk. Risk is the likelihood that purchased assets will decrease in price 
and thereby impart a loss to an investor. 145 Higher risk is a source of higher 
generates "higher quality and/or lower-cost products"). Categories of innovation include new products 
for consumers (i.e., goods and services), new methods of production, and new forms of business 
organization. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: AN INQUIRY 
INTO PROFITS, CAPITAL, CREDIT, INTEREST, AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE 66 (Transaction ed. 1983) 
( 1934) (innovation consists of new goods, new methods of production, exploitation of new markets and 
sources of supply, and new forms of organization). 
142. See Robert C. Merton, Financial Innovation and Economic Performance, 4. J. APPL. CORP. 
FIN. 12, 12 (1992) ("The primary function of the financial system is to facilitate the allocation and 
deployment of economic resources, both spatially and across time, in an uncertain environment."). 
143. "Liquidity" means either the ease with which an investor has access to credit or can sell an 
asset without incurring a substantial loss. Stephen G. Cecchetti, Federal Reserve Policy Actions in 
August 2007: Frequently Asked Questions, VoxEU.org, August 13, 2007, 
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/460. 
144. Arjuna Sittampalam, The Pioneering Role of Hedge Funds, EDHEC Risk, Alternative 
Investments, Feb. 23, 2009. 
145. Burton G. Malkiel, A Random Walk Down Wall Street, in FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 
29, 29 (Roberta Romano ed. 1999). 
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returns because investors must be compensated for taking greater risks. 146 For 
example, stocks typically have higher returns than bonds because taking an 
equity position in a company to share in its profits is generally riskier than 
k. I h · · 141 ma mg a oan to t at company to receive mterest payments. 
"Modem portfolio theory" focuses on those returns attributable to risk and 
teaches that investors should seek to maximize risk-adjusted returns. 148 Risk-
adjusted return is a measure of how much risk an investor must take to earn a 
certain level of return. Higher risk-adjusted returns give investors greater 
assurance that they will receive the expected return from an investment rather 
than suffering a loss. 149 Financial risk is typically measured by calculating the 
standard deviation of an investment's return, which shows how likely it is that 
the investment will produce a return either greater or less than its historical 
average. 150 Other measures of risk focus solely on the likelihood that an 
investment will impart a loss to the investor or fail to achieve a specific 
investment goal. For example, the value-at-risk measure shows how much an 
investor can expect to lose over a given period, and the shortfall-risk measure 
shows the likelihood of an investor not achieving, or falling short of, a desired 
rate of retum. 151 Risk-adjusted returns are maximized when, taking into 
account the different measures of risk, an investor is receiving the highest 
possible return for the total amount of risk they are taking on. 152 In deciding 
among different investments, investors should choose a combination of risk and 
return consistent with their investment goals and tolerance for risk. 
Two components of overall investment risk are idiosyncratic risk and 
market risk. Idiosyncratic risks arise from the particular circumstances of a 
company or related issuers, such as management quality and employee 
retention. 153 Market risk, by contrast, is the risk that the value of an investment 
146. See id. at 35; RICHARD A. BREALY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 193-94 (8th 
ed. 2006) (reviewing empirical evidence of the risk-return relationship). 
147. BREALY ET AL., supra note 146,at 147-49. 
148. Modem portfolio theory was first developed by Nobel prize-winning economist Harry 
Markowitz in the 1950s. See Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952); HARRY M. 
MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF INVESTMENTS ( 1959). 
149. LHABITANT, supra note 15, at 455. 
150. Malkiel, supra note 145, at 29-30. 
151. LHABITANT, supra note 15, at 443-44. 
152. The Sharpe ratio is the most common way of measuring risk-adjusted returns. A Sharpe ratio 
is calculated by dividing an investment's return in excess of the return to a hypothetical "risk-free" 
investment (typically proxied by the return on the ninety-day U.S. Treasury bill) by the standard 
deviation of the returns. See LEDERMAN, supra note 17, at § I :3, 1-18; LHABITANT, supra note 15, at 
455. The Sortino ratio is another measure of risk-adjusted returns, which incorporates the downside risk 
measures by comparing an investment's return to its risk of incurring a level of losses below some 
minimum acceptable amount. See id. at 472-73; HEDGECO.NET, SHARPE Vs SORTINO RATIO (2003), 
http://www.hedgeco.net/sharpe-ratio-sortino-ratio.htm. 
153. BREALY ET AL., supra note 146, at 162. Idiosyncratic risk is also referred to in the finance 
literature as "unsystematic" risk or "unique" risk. See Malkiel, supra note 145, at 34. 
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will increase or decrease along with fluctuations in the overall market. 154 
Market risk arises because economy-wide changes often impact a significant, if 
not overwhelming, portion of individual companies and other issuers, and 
thereby cause the security prices of different companies to move up or down 
together. 155 
Although investments with higher returns tend to have higher risk, 
diversification can reduce overall investment risk without reducing returns. 
Diversification is accomplished by broadening the different sources of 
investment risk to which an investor is exposed, and requires investing in a 
portfolio of numerous securities from a wide range of issuers and types of 
assets (e.g., stocks, bonds, commodities, real estate). 156 As explained by Nobel 
Prize-winning economist James Tobin, diversification cautions investors 
against putting all their "eggs in one basket." 157 Diversification reduces risk to 
the extent that the returns of different securities are independent of (i.e., have a 
!ow correlation to) one another. 158 Having a low correlation means that when 
some securities perform poorly, others may perform well, and the net effect is 
to insulate a portfolio from overall losses. Diversification reduces idiosyncratic 
risk because losses stemming from the unique circumstances of any single 
issuer are not correlated with losses from others. 159 Empirical research finds 
that idiosyncratic risk can be minimized by purchasing the securities of 
approximately twenty different companies. 160 
Once an investment portfolio is diversified with respect to idiosyncratic 
risk, the remaining risk to a portfolio comes from market risk. 161 Properly 
understood, risk is therefore not about the risk of individual securities; rather, it 
is a portfolio-level issue regarding the impact of adding securities on the 
likelihood of a portfolio experiencing losses. 162 Market risk is the sensitivity of 
a portfolio's, or an individual security's, price to movements in the general 
market, and it is represented by the quantity known as beta (J3). 163 A portfolio 
with a beta equal to one will perfectly mirror returns of the market; a portfolio 
with a beta of zero is "market neutral" and will not change in response to 
changes in the market; a beta of negative-one means a portfolio will return the 
154. Unless otherwise noted, this Article adopts the standard convention of measuring "the market" 
by the value of the Standard and Poor's 500 Index, which tracks the stock prices of 500 of the largest 
public companies operating in the U.S. See, e.g., Richard Roll & Stephen A. Ross, The Arbitrage 
Pricing Theory Approach to Strategic Portfolio Planning, FIN. ANAL. J. 122, 128 ( 1995). 
155. BREALY ET AL., supra note 146, at 162; Malkiel, supra note 145, at 34. 
156. Malkiel, supra note 145, at 32. 
157. James Tobin, Recipient of the 1981 Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, 
Lecture at Trinity University (April 30, 1985). 
158. See Malkiel, supra note 145, at 32-33. 
159. BREALY ET AL., supra note 146, at 161-62. 
160. Id. at 162. 
161. See BREAL Y ET AL., supra note 146, at 167; Malkiel, supra note 145, at 35-36. 
162. LHABITANT,supra note 15, at 540. 
163. BREAL Y ET AL., supra note 146, at 167. 
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exact opposite of the market (e.g., a 10 percent market gain will result in a 10 
percent loss); and a beta of two will have returns with double the magnitude of 
the market (in either direction). 164 Diversification by purchasing securities from 
different asset classes can decrease market risk because securities from 
different classes are exposed to different sources of market risk. 165 For 
example, stocks are generally exposed to fluctuations in the overall economy, 
while bonds are exposed to changes in interest rates. 166 
The capital asset pricing model shows that investors are generally awarded 
higher returns only for investing in securities with more market risk (higher 
beta). 167 To maximize risk-adjusted returns, investors should therefore invest in 
an efficient portfolio that yields the highest return for the level of market risk 
that they are willing to bear. 168 Because returns are dependent upon manager 
skill (a) and market risk (p), this relationship can be expressed mathematically 
as 
Rp= a+ PRm 
where Rp is the return to a portfolio and Rm the return of the general market. 169 
"Arbitrage Pricing Theory" goes one step further by unpacking market risk 
into various components. 170 According to Arbitrage Pricing Theory, the return 
to a portfolio of securities is not simply dependent on economy-wide changes 
and a portfolio's sensitivity to those changes in the aggregate, but upon changes 
in several market-risk factors such as interest rates, foreign exchange rates, and 
changes in inflation forecasts. 171 Accordingly, there are several different betas, 
each reflecting the sensitivity of a portfolio to a specific market risk factor. If, 
for example, the return to a portfolio (Rp) is dependent upon manager skill and 
interest rates, exchange rates, and inflation, this relationship can be expressed 
as 
Rp =a+ P1R1NT+ P2RFOREX + p3R1NF 
where P1 represents the sensitivity of the portfolio to interest rates and RrNT is 
the change in the interest rate, p2 is the sensitivity of the portfolio to foreign 
exchange fluctuations and RFOREX is the change in foreign exchange rates, and 
P3 is the sensitivity of the portfolio to inflation and RrNF is the change in the 
inflation rate. As with market risk, diversification across asset classes can 
164. Id. Stocks of relatively risky companies such as Amazon.com have higher betas than those of 
staples of the economy such as Coca-Cola. From January 1999 to December 2003, the beta of 
Amazon.com was 2.22 whereas it was 0.28 for Coca-Cola. Id. at 168. 
165. LHABITANT,supra note 15, at 539-541. 
166. Id. at 548. 
167. BREALY ET AL., supra note 146, at 188-89; Malkiel, supra note 145, at 35. 
168. BREALY ET AL., supra note 146, at 182-85. 
169. M. Barton Waring & Laurence B. Siegel, The Myth of the Absolute-Return Investor, 6 FIN. 
ANAL. J. 12, 15 (2006); FILIPPO STEFANINI, INVESTMENT STRATEGIES OF HEDGE FUNDS 69-70 (2007). 
170. See, e.g., Rall & Ross, supra note 154, at 122-26 (reviewing Arbitrage Pricing Theory). 
171. BREALY ET AL., supra note 146, at 199. 
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decrease losses from systematic risk factors because the returns to such 
securities are relatively uncorrelated. 172 In sum, diversification among 
securities and across classes of financial instruments reduces a portfolio's 
overall investment risk and thereby facilitates the maximization of risk-adjusted 
returns. 
2. Transaction Costs and Idiosyncratic Risk 
Constructing a diversified portfolio requires a sufficient level of financial 
acumen, time, capital, and other resources to search for and monitor investment 
opportunities. Furthermore, investors with relatively small amounts of capital 
face high transaction costs in attempting to diversify by directly investing in 
multiple separate issuers of securities and in other assets. 173 Investment 
intermediaries such as banks, mutual funds, and hedge funds reduce transaction 
costs by utilizing their specialized skills and resources to inform or make 
informed investment decisions for others, and by operating on a large enough 
scale to take advantage of scale economies. 174 Investment intermediaries do, 
however, introduce transaction costs that investors would not bear if investing 
on their own and, as a consequence, may provide no net value to investors. 
The two most economically significant investment intermediaries are 
depository institutions and registered investment companies. 175 A depository 
institution is a financial intermediary whose primary source of funds is deposits 
and for which a substantial source of profit derives from earning interest from 
making loans. 176 Depository institutions include commercial banks, savings 
and loans institutions, and credit unions. 177 Depository institutions have 
introduced several innovations relevant to investors. They have decreased 
transaction costs by offering investors a place for safekeeping of their assets, 
easy access to cash, and a way to pool a small amount of capital with other 
small investors to benefit from returns (in the form of interest payments) on 
large loans to borrowers. 178 Furthermore, depository institutions allow 
investors (depositors) to diversify and lower idiosyncratic risk by lending their 
funds to numerous borrowers and using the institution's superior expertise in 
172. See Rall & Ross, supra note 154, at 122 (noting that "[ d]ifferent portfolios have different 
sensitivities to these [systematic risk] factors" such that a "portfolio that is so hedged as to be insensitive 
to these factors ... is essentially riskless"); id. at 127 ("Altering the mix of stocks and bonds in the 
portfolio will certainly affect the amount and type of risk exposure" to systematic risk factors). 
173. KEVIN DOWD, COMPETITION AND FINANCE: A REINTERPRETATION OF FINANCIAL AND 
MONETARY ECONOMICS 25 (1996). 
174. Id. at 114-120; STEPHEN G. CECCHETTI, MONEY, BANKING AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 259 
(2006). Of course, borrowers often raise funds directly by issuing securities such as stocks and bonds. 
Id. 
175. CECCHETTI supra note 174, at 330-31. 
176. Id. at 286. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 264-67. 
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making and monitoring loans. 179 However, loan making is inherently limited in 
its ability to maximize depositors' risk-adjusted returns. Commercial banks are 
prohibited by law from owning stock in public companies, and can therefore 
only earn the relatively safer, but relatively lower, returns on debt investing. 180 
Banks are also restricted in their use of derivatives generally to hedging their 
loan-related risks, 181 which limits their ability to expose investors to a broader 
range of risk and return. 
A registered investment company is a publicly available pooled investment 
fund that may take one of three legal forms in the U.S.: open-end, closed-end, 
or as a unit investment trust. The most widely-utilized type of registered 
investment companies are mutual funds, 182 which are a type of open-end 
investment company that sells shares to individual and institutional investors 
that do not trade on secondary markets. 183 Closed-end registered investment 
companies offer fixed numbers of shares that trade in secondary markets. 184 
Investment companies decrease transaction costs and idiosyncratic risk by 
typically investing in a diverse portfolio of securities. The mutual fund market 
is extremely differentiated with funds specializing in securities based upon 
types of assets (e.g., stocks, bonds, or money-market instruments), firm size 
(i.e., so-called large-cap, mid-cap or small-cap funds), sector (e.g., energy 
companies, technology companies), and/or geographic location (e.g., emerging 
markets). 185 Mutual funds typically adopt a traditional, "long-only" investment 
179. Id. at 267-68; ALAN D. MORRISON & WILLIAM J. WILLHELM, JR., INVESTMENT BANKING: 
INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS, AND LAW 3 (2007) (noting that bank depositors "play no part in interpreting or 
gathering" the information that banks acquire from borrowers). 
180. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act §16, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh); 12 U.S.C. § 335; 12 C.F.R. pt. I 
(describing the different types of debt instruments in which banks may invest). Commercial banks may, 
however, engage in a wide range of financial services activities through qualified affiliates. See 
generally RICHARDS. CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 27, 425-
94 (4th ed. 2009). 
181. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Bulletin 96-43, Credit Derivative, Guidelines for 
National Banks, Aug. 12, 1996; LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY w. MARKAM, REGULATION OF BANKS 
FINANCIAL SERVICES ACTIVITIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 922 (2d ed. 2004) (noting that "a bank 
trading in derivatives for its own account must use that trading to offset some other risk. Speculation is 
not allowed."). 
182. As of the end of the third quarter of 2008, the total assets managed by U.S. mutual funds was 
$10.63 trillion, closed-end funds managed $238.44 billion, and unit investment trusts managed $1.35 
billion. See Investment Company Institute, Archive of "Trends" Releases, 
http://www.ici.org/stats/mf/arctrends/; Investment Company Institute, Closed-End Fund Statistics, 
http://www.ici.org/stats/ce; Investment Company Institute, Unit Investment Trust Statistics, 
http://www.ici.org/stats/uit/. 
183. SEC, INVEST WISELY: AN INTRODUCTION TO MUTUAL FUNDS, 
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/inwsmf.htm ("Legally known as an 'open-end company,' a mutual 
fund is one of three basic types of investment companies."); Company Act § 4(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-4(3) 
(defining "management company"); Company Act § 5(a)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(I) (defining a 
management company as "open-end" if it "is offering for sale or has outstanding any redeemable 
security of which it is the issuer"). 
184. SEC, supra note 183. 
185. See Dustin Woodard, Different Types of Mutual Funds, About.com, 
http://mutualfunds.about.com/ cs/bui ldingblocks/a/fund _types. him. 
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strategy consisting of purchasing stocks and/or bonds, earning dividend or 
interest income, and ultimately selling the securities at a higher price. 186 A 
mutual fund's performance is evaluated by comparing a fund's returns to the 
overall performance of the market or other relevant benchmark. 187 
Mutual funds are an improvement over banks because they offer investors a 
relatively low-cost method to invest in a diverse portfolio of stocks that can 
earn higher returns than bank deposits. 188 However, the relatively higher 
returns of mutual funds come with increased risk. Mutual funds specializing in 
equities, for instance, reward investors with higher returns at the expense of 
increasing exposure to stock market risk. Furthermore, investment company 
regulation hampers the ability of mutual funds and closed-end registered 
investment companies to decrease or diversify away market risk through the 
I f d. . I . . I 189 F emp oyment o non-tra 1t1ona mvestment strategies or asset c asses. or 
instance, the Company Act's requirement that a registered investment company 
must offset a short position hampers the ability of mutuai funds to engagt: in 
short sales to reduce the exposure of the fund to decreases in stock prices and 
hence market risk. Accordingly, during economic downturns mutual funds 
typically remain invested in securities even as they continue to decrease in 
value. 
3. Hedge Fund Investment Strategies and Market Risk 
While depository institutions and mutual funds benefit investors by 
reducing investment transaction costs and idiosyncratic risk, hedge funds are 
uniquely able to reduce losses from market risk. Exclusion from the definition 
of "investment company" under the Company Act permits hedge funds to 
employ leverage, short sales, and derivatives without having to comply with the 
Act's restrictions with respect to those activities. Not having to comply with the 
Company Act enables hedge funds to more easily pursue investment strategies 
with a low correlation to the overall market than mutual funds, which typically 
seek returns relative to the overall market (or a segment of the market). 190 
Hedge funds' relatively low market risk is achieved by utilizing innovative 
investment strategies that go beyond traditional Jong-only investments in stocks 
and bonds. In 1949, Alfred Winslow Jones started the first modern hedge fund 
186. LEDERMAN, supra note 17, at § 1:3, 1-16-17 (noting that traditional investment strategies 
consist of stocks, bonds, and other fixed-income investments). 
187. Bing Liang, On the Performance of Hedge Funds, 55 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 72, 72 (1999) 
(contrasting hedge funds with "mutual funds and other traditional investment vehicles" that evaluate 
returns relative to an external benchmark). 
188. Compare Federal Reserve Statistical Release, Historical Data, H.15 Selected Interest Rates, 
Annual I-Month Certificate of Deposit, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H 15/data.htm (follow 
CDs, Secondary Market, I-Month Annual), with EconStats, S&P 500 (Large Cap) Index US Yearly 
Data, %Chg for Year, http://www.econstats.com/eqty/eqea _mi_ l .htm. 
189. See supra Section LC. I. 
190. LEDERMAN, supra note 17, at§ I :3, 1-17; LHABITANT,supra note 15, at 32. 
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by combining traditional Jong positions in stocks he believed would increase in 
price with short positions in stocks of companies he believed would decrease in 
price. 191 Since that time, so-called "long-short equity" funds have become a 
primary type of hedge fund strategy and in 2008 were employed by 
approximately 40 percent of hedge funds comprising 27 percent of industry 
assets. 192 
In addition to long-short equity, there are three other general types of hedge 
fund investment strategies that together encompass the overwhelming portion 
of funds in the industry. These strategies are relative value, corporate event 
driven, and directional funds. Relative value funds are those that employ the 
trading technique known as arbitrage, which seeks to profit from a price 
discrepancy between two assets that are expected to change. 193 One type of 
relative value fund is convertible bond arbitrage, which seek gains based upon 
a temporary mismatch between the price of a corporate bond and the stock of 
the company that the convertible bondholder has a right to convert the bond 
into. 194 Convertible bond arbitrage strategies were first utilized by the 
proprietary trading desks of large investment banks. 195 Another type of relative 
value strategy are strategies specializing in mortgage-backed securities (MBS) 
arbitrage. An MBS is a security that pays investors periodic interest payments 
stemming from a pool of underlying mortgage payments. 196 The first MBS was 
introduced in 1978 and hedge funds pioneered the arbitrage of MBS by using 
innovative models to value the cash flows of an MBS. The interest rate risk to 
which MBS securities are exposed is typically hedged by short positions in 
Treasury bonds (or derivatives). 197 Other relative value trading strategies 
include fixed income arbitrage and equity market neutral funds. 198 
Corporate event driven strategies seek to profit from trades based upon 
company extraordinary events such as mergers or bankruptcies. 199 A type of 
corporate event driven strategy is merger arbitrage, which seeks to purchase the 
stock of a company that has just announced that it will be acquired and sell 
short the stock of the acquiring company with the expectation that the acquiring 
company's stock will fall after the acquisition and the acquired company's 
stock will increase. 200 Other event driven funds include those that invest in 
191. LHABITANT, supra note 15, at 8-10. 
192. EUREKAHEDGE, THE EUREKAHEDGE REPORT 11, Jan. 2009 (estimating strategy composition 
of North American hedge funds). 
193. STEFANINl,supranote 169,at 14. 
194. Id. at 99-100; LHABITANT,supra note 15, at 279-84. 
195. LHABITANT, supra note 15, at 287-88. 
196. STEFANINI, supra note 169, at 167. 
197. Id. at 173-74. 
198. For general descriptions of these sub-strategies see LHABITANT, supra note 15, at 197-214, 
297-310. 
199. STEFANINI supra note 169, at 14. 
200. Id. at 75-76, 82-83. 
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underperfonning securities and those that engage in corporate activism. 201 
Compared to institutional shareholders such as mutual funds and pension funds, 
hedge funds are much more active in monitoring and influencing corporate 
managers and practice innovative means of cooperating with managers and 
other forms of activism. 202 Empirical studies strongly suggest that hedge fund 
activism generally benefits investors of the companies that hedge funds 
influence. 203 
Directional investment strategies seek gains from major trends in the 
market. 204 A popular type of directional hedge fund is a global macro fund, 
which invests in a broad array of financial instruments based upon an analysis 
of macroeconomic conditions in various countries and takes into account such 
factors as gross domestic product, demographics, and currency exchange 
rates. 205 In the early 1990s, the global macro hedge funds of George Soros, 
Julian Robertson, and others pioneered taking large and leveraged positions in 
foreign currencies. 206 Although global macro funds accounted for 
approximately 32 percent of hedge fund assets in 1994, 207 by 2008 
approximately 8 percent of fund assets were involved with the strategy.208 
The foregoing innovative hedge fund investment strategies have the general 
effect of reducing an investor's exposure to market risk. This is demonstrated 
by hedge funds generally exhibiting betas lower than equity mutual funds, both 
in the aggregate and across the vast majority of specific fund strategies.209 
Using overlapping but not equivalent time periods, Figure l compares the betas 
of the foregoing general hedge fund strategies to that of equity mutual funds 
ordered by beta. Figure I illustrates that all four hedge fund strategies have a 
201. Id. at 14. 
202. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 99, at 1042-45. See also generally Frank Partnoy & Randall 
Thomas, Gap Filling, Hedge Funds, and Financial Innovation, in NEW FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND 
INSTITUTIONS: OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY CHALLENGES 101 {Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan 
eds.) (describing the innovative aspects of hedge fund activism); Robert C. Illig, What Hedge Funds Can 
Teach Corporate America: A Roadmap for Achieving Institutional Investor Oversight, 57 AM. U. L. 
REV. 225 (2007-2008). 
203. See generally Alon Brav, Wei Jan, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism, 
Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729 (2008); Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate 
Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism: An Empirical Analysis, 32 J. CORP. L. 681 (2006-
2007); Christopher P. Clifford, Value Creation or Destrnction? Hedge Funds As Shareholder Activists, 
14 J. CORP. FIN. 323 {2008). 
204. STEFANINI, supra note 169, at 14. 
205. Id. at 239-40. See also STEVEN DROBNY, INSIDE THE HOUSE OF MONEY: TOP HEDGE FUND 
TRADERS ON PROFITING IN THE GLOBAL MARKETS (2006) (describing the wide array of global macro 
strategies through interviews with hedge fund managers). 
206. STEFANINI, supra note 169, at 240-41; LHABITANT,supra note 15, at 12-15, 327-50. 
207. BARTH ET AL., supra note 44, at 19. 
208. EUREKAHEDGE, supra note 192. 
209. See Bing Liang, On the Performance of Hedge Funds, 55 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 72, 78, 79 (1999) 
(noting that "hedge funds are absolute performers with no relative benchmark" and finding empirically 
that "the low beta value for hedge fund groups indicate that hedge funds have low systematic risk"); 
Daniel Capocci & Georges Hilbner, Analysis of Hedge Fund Performance, I I J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 55, 73 
tabl. 5 panel C (2004) (estimating the betas and alphas of hedge funds by strategy from 1994 to 2000). 
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lower average beta than equity mutual funds when equity mutual funds are 
separated into low, medium, and high beta mutual funds. 210 This means that 
mutual funds are generally more exposed to market risk than hedge funds. 
Figure 1: Market Risk of Hedge Funds Versus Mutual Funds 
Sources: Capocci & Hubner (2004), Chalmers et al. (2001). 
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Furthermore, hedge funds have relatively low correlation to market risk 
when market risk is unpacked into separate systemic risk factors. In a 
comparison of hedge fund returns with those of mutual funds based upon how 
sensitive each is to standard systematic risk factors (such as changes in stock 
prices, bond prices, and the value of the dollar), William Fung and David Hsieh 
found that hedge funds have a relatively low correlation to standard systematic 
factors compared to mutual funds. 211 Fung and Hsieh also applied arbitrage 
210. Capocci & Hilbner, supra note 209, at 73 tab!. 5 panel C; John M.R. Chalmers et al., On the 
Perils of Financial Intermediaries Setting Security Prices: The Mutual Fund Wild Card Option, 57 J. 
FIN. 2209, 2217 tab!. Ill (2001) (estimating equity mutual fund betas from February 1, 1998 to March 
30, 2000). Although Figure 1 is an accurate reflection of average market correlations by broad 
classifications of hedge funds and equity mutual funds, particular hedge funds may have higher betas 
than average mutual funds and particular mutual funds may have lower betas than average hedge funds. 
211. See William K.H. Fung & David A. Hsieh, Hedge Funds: An Industry in Its Adolescence, 91 
ECON. REV. 1, 8 (2006). Notwithstanding their typically low correlation to market movements, hedge 
fund returns may become more correlated to general market trends during downturns. Monica Billio, 
Mila Getmansky & Loriana Pelizzon, Phase-Locking and Switching Volatility in Hedge Funds 38 
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pricing theory to determine what specific systematic risk factors are common to 
hedge funds. 212 They found that hedge funds are exposed to a set of non-
standard risk factors such as the difference between returns to small and large 
cap stocks.213 Accordingly, hedge fund innovation helps to diversify a portfolio 
by lowering exposures to standard market risks and broadening the types of risk 
to which investors are exposed. 
4. Unique Costs and Risks of Hedge Fund Innovation 
Although hedge fund innovation reduces exposures to market risk and 
standard systematic risk factors, it would be premature to conclude on this basis 
that the funds reduce overall investment risk and thereby make investors better 
off. Specifically, overall investment risk may be increased if decreasing market 
risk comes at the expense of increasing hedge fund-specific risks by even more. 
More generally, the benefits of hedge fund innovation must be weighed against 
the costs and risks unique to investing in hedge funds. These costs and risks 
include unique transaction costs and higher company-specific risks than public 
companies. 
First, hedge funds typically require investors to bear unique transaction 
costs because, unlike making bank deposits or purchasing mutual fund shares, 
hedge funds charge a relatively high management fee and also typically 
constrain the ability of investors to immediately withdraw their capital.214 If a 
hedge fund fails to outperform other collective investment vehicles with lower 
management fees, the relatively high hedge fund management fees are not 
worth paying. In addition, despite their generally low correlation to market risk 
factors, hedge funds may not be an attractive investment to investors seeking to 
withdraw their capital due to the redemption restrictions often exercised by the 
funds. 215 
(Department of Economics, Ca' Foscari University of Venice Working Paper, November 2006) (finding 
"that exposures [to market factors] can be strongly different in the down-market regimes compared to 
normal times suggesting that risk exposures of hedge funds in the down-market regimes are quite 
different than those faced during normal regimes"); Javier Mencia, Testing Dependence Between 
Financial Returns, An Application to the Hedge Fund Industry 3 (Bank of Spain Working Paper, 
January 2006) (finding that "when strong shocks to the market occur, ['hedge funds'] diversification 
benefits seem to deteriorate due to non-linear dependence"). But see Nicole M. Boyson, Christof W. 
Stahel & Rene M. Stulz, ls There Hedge Fund Contagion? 26 (National Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper, March 2007) (finding "no systematic evidence of contagion between broad markets and 
hedge funds"), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=884202. 
212. William Fung & David A. Hsieh, Empirical Characteristics of Dynamic Trading Strategies: 
The Case of Hedge Funds, 10 REV. FIN. STUD. 275 (1997); William Fung & David A. Hsieh, Hedge 
Fund Benchmarks: A Risk-Based Approach, 60 FIN. ANAL. J. 65 (2004) (noting that, like Arbitrage 
Pricing Theory, their "hedge fund risk-factor model similarly helps investors identify the common 
sources ofrisk"). 
213. Fung & Hsieh, Hedge Fund Benchmarks, supra note 212, at 71. 
214. See infra Part 11.B.2 regarding the economic impact of hedge fund redemption restrictions. 
215. See generally Andrew Ang & Nicolas P.B. Bollen, Locked Up By a Lockup: Valuing 
Liquidity As a Real Option, (Columbia Business School and Vanderbilt University Working Paper, Nov. 
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Second, hedge funds' low correlation to market risk factors also comes at 
the expense of increasing company-specific risk. Unlike traditional stocks and 
bonds whose returns are normally distributed like a bell curve, particular hedge 
funds' returns are typically more asymmetric. Hedge fund returns exhibit the 
higher moment statistical return properties of negative skew and high 
kurtosis. 216 This means that when hedge fund returns are negative, their losses 
may be very large. Indeed, this large loss risk may increase as more hedge 
funds are added to a portfolio. 217 
Nonetheless, despite hedge funds' generally higher company-specific risk, 
returns to the funds as a whole exhibit lower overall risk than the equity 
market. To adequately measure the net impact of hedge funds on overall 
investment risk, downside risk measures must be utilized in addition to the 
market risk measure discussed above. 218 One such measure is the maximum 
drawdown, which calculates the most an investor can lose over a time period. 
Comparing the maximum drawdown of hedge funds to that of other asset 
classes from January 1994 to December 2005, Fran\:ois-Serge Lhabitant found 
that hedge funds were less risky than all other asset classes except government 
bonds. 219 For example, whereas maximum drawdowns for the NASDAQ and 
S&P 500 stock indices were 75.03 percent and 46.28 percent respectively, the 
worst loss an investor in a diversified portfolio of hedge funds could have 
experienced was 13 .81 percent. 220 As discussed in Part III, hedge funds 
continued to lose less than the overall stock market through 2008. 
B. Hedge Fund Governance and Innovation 
Hedge funds' flat uncorporate governance structure is a successful 
adaptation to the needs of an investment fund required to innovate to be 
successful. Innovation stems from learning and from discovering new 
13, 2008) (modeling the costs of hedge fund lockups to investors), available at 
http://ssm.com/abstract= 1291842. 
216. See, e.g., Chris Brooks, & Harry M. Kat, The Statistical Properties of Hedge Fund Index 
Returns and Their Implications for Investors, 5 J. ALT. INVESTMENTS 26 (2002); Burton G. Malkiel & 
Atanu Saha, Hedge Funds: Risk and Return, 61 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 80, 80 (2005). 
217. E.g., Harry M. Kat, Integrating Hedge Funds into the Traditional Portfolio, in HEDGE FUNDS: 
INSIGHTS IN PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT, RISK ANALYSIS AND PORTFOLIO ALLOCATION 3, 3-15 
(Greg N. Gregoriou et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter HEDGE FUND INSIGHTS]; Fran~ois-Serge Lhabitant & 
Michelle Learned, Hedge Fund Diversification: How Much is Enough? 3-4 (FAME Research Working 
Paper No. 52, July 2002). 
218. See, e.g., Hilary Till, Risk Considerations Unique to Hedge Funds, QUANTITATIVE FIN. 409-
11 (2002); Natalya Lyzanets & Maksym Senchyna, Comparing Different Value-at-Risk Models for 
Hedge Funds, University of Lausanne Working Paper, October 2005; Daniel Giamouridis & Ntoula 
Joanna, A Comparison of Alternative Approaches for Determining the Downside Risk of Hedge Fund 
Strategies (Cass Business School Research Paper, October 2006); Martin Eling, Performance 
Measurement of Hedge Funds Using Data Envelopment Analysis, 20 FIN. MARKETS PORTFOLIO MGMT. 
4 (2006). 
219. LHABITANT, supra note 15, at 520, fig. 23.3. 
220. Id. 
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knowledge, which may be contained by individuals within a firm or from a 
firm's external environment,221 and is facilitated by decentralized and flexible 
governance structures that allow knowledge to be efficiently generated, 
disseminated, and acted upon. 222 Flat, uncorporate governance allows hedge 
fund managers to quickly adapt investment strategies and other aspects of 
operations to changing economic conditions. 223 Furthermore, hedge fund 
governance devices (e.g., performance fees, lock-ups) foster the types of 
incentives and financial commitment conducive to implementing innovation 
activities. 224 By aligning the interests of investors and managers, hedge fund 
governance devices reduce the transaction costs associated with delegating 
investment decision making to a portfolio manager. 
1. Managerial Performance-Based Incentives 
Hedge fund manager incentives are primarily derived from managerial co-
investment and profit-based performance fees. 225 The success of hedge funds in 
innovating is likely due in part to this incentive structure. Innovative activities 
221. O'SULLIVAN, supra note 141, at 12-14 (characterizing innovation as a cumulative learning 
process based upon the existing "common stock of knowledge"); Per Davidsson, Harry J. Sapienza & 
Shaker A. Zahra, Entrepreneurship and Dynamic Capabilities: A Review, Model and Research Agenda, 
43 J. MGMT. STUD. 917, 932 (2006) (arguing that innovative "learning 
... depends on what [firms] already know"); Keith Pavitt, Innovation Process, in HANDBOOK ON 
INNOVATION 86, supra note 141, at 88 (noting that some of the knowledge learned in the innovation 
process is firm-specific). The ability to innovate from knowledge external to the firm reflects what 
organizational researchers refer to as a firm's "absorptive capacity." See Wesley M. Cohen & Daniel 
Levinthal, Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on learning and Innovation, 35 ADMIN. SCI. 
QTRL Y. 128, 128 ( 1990). See also Tunji Adegbesan & Joan E. Ricart, What Do We Really Know About 
When Technological Innovation Improves Performance (and When It Does Not)? 12-13 (IESE Business 
School University of Navarra Working Paper, 2007) (reviewing innovation research to find that 
"innovativeness is dependent on a firm's ability to leverage external knowledge, integrating it with its 
internal knowledge sources"). 
222. See Shadab, supra note 128, at 970-82 (arguing that public companies with more decentralized 
governance structures are associated with more innovation activities). 
223. By contrast, outside monitoring and hierarchical corporate governance devices are generally 
less suited to facilitate the types of activities that support innovation. Id. 
224. Measuring the performance impact of particular hedge fund governance devices likely suffers 
from well-known endogeneity problems. See Samjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, The 
Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices 41-45 (University of Colorado, University of New 
Hampshire, Yale Law School, NBER and ECGI Working Paper, Oct. 7, 2007) (reviewing literature on 
the endogeneity between corporate performance and governance structures). However, because hedge 
fund governance devices are established and disclosed to investors before any capital contributions are 
made and are typically held constant over the course of the life of a fund, measuring the relationship 
between hedge fund governance and performance may be less prone to error in practice. Agarwal et al., 
supra note 52, at 3. 
225. See Agarwal et al., supra note 52, at 5 ("[W]e estimate the total delta, the overall pay-
performance sensitivity measure, as the total expected dollar increase in the manager's compensation for 
a one-percent increase in fund's NAV ... [which] combines the delta from investors' assets (manager's 
option delta) and the delta from the manager's co-investment.") (emphasis in original). Career concerns 
also create incentives for hedge fund managers, and have been found to align incentives. Stephen J. 
Brown, William N. Goetzmann & James Park, Careers and Survival: Competition and Risk in the 
Hedge Fund and CTA Industry, 56 J. FIN. 1869, 1869, 1184-85 (2001). 
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tend to involve a relatively higher degree of risk than non-innovative ones. 226 
Innovation by definition involves something new and unknown, and therefore 
requires undertaking activities with a relatively higher degree of uncertainty 
d . h . 221 A . . h ~ regar mg t eir outcomes. s mnovat10n researc ers suggest, per1ormance-
based compensation provides incentives to take such risks. 228 Furthermore, a 
fund manager's compensation attributable to the performance fee is effectively 
the same as a payout from a call option with a "strike price" set at the value of 
the fund when each investor joins. 229 A call option is a contract that gives the 
option holder the right to purchase a security at a predetermined strike price, 
yielding a profit equal to the difference in the market price and strike price 
(minus the purchase price of the option). When a hurdle rate is employed by a 
hedge fund, the manager effectively begins the investment period below the 
high-water mark ("out of the money"), a position that may optimally align 
incentives. 230 That a hedge fund performance fee has the same payout as a call 
option likely reflects the more general phenomenon that the incentives and 
gains related to innovation are also the same as the payout from an option.231 
Managerial co-investment unsurprisingly seems to align incentives and 
increase performance. Although few empirical studies assess the impact of 
managerial co-ownership on fund performance, a study by Agarwal et al. of a 
representative sample of 7 ,535 hedge funds from 1995 to 2004 found a positive 
and statistically significant relationship between co-investment and 
performance.232 However, co-investment beyond a certain level may decrease 
performance to the extent that high co-investment could result in the fund 
226. Bengt Holmstrom, Agency Costs and Innovation, 12 J. ECON. BEHAV. ORG. 305, 309 (1989). 
227. Mary O'Sullivan, Finance and Innovation, in HANDBOOK ON INNOVATION 86, supra note 141, 
at 257-58; Pavitt Innovation Processes in HANDBOOK ON INNOVATION 86, supra note 141, at 88 
("Innovation is inherently uncertain, given the impossibility of predicting accurately the cost and 
performance ofa new artifact, and the reaction of users to it."). 
228. O'SULLIVAN, supra note 141, at 60-61 ("[T]he prospects of sharing in the gains of successful 
innovation by the investing organization can lead even mobile participants to forgo the lure of the 
market and remain committed to the pursuit of organizational goals."); Paulina Ramirez & Andrew 
Tylecote, Corporate Governance and Innovation: The U.K. Compared with the U.S. and "Insider" 
Economies, 35 RES. POL'Y, 160, 162 (2006); Vincent L. Barker II & George C. Mueller, CEO 
Characteristics and Firm R&D Spending, 48 MGMT. SCI. 782, 793 (2002); Jeffrey L. Coles, Naveen D. 
Daniel & Lalitha Naveen, Managerial Incentives & Risk-Taking, 79 J. FIN. ECON. 431, 464 (2006). 
229. William N. Goetzmann, Jonathan E. Ingersoll & Stephen Ross, High-Water Marks and Hedge 
Fund Management Contracts, 4 J. FIN. 1685, I 714-16 (2003); Mark J.P. Anson, Hedge Fund Incentives 
Fees and the "Free Option," J. ALT. INVESTMENTS 43, 43-44 (Fall 2001). 
230. See Agarwal et al., supra note 52, at 4-5. 
231. See Steven R. Grenadier & Allen M. Weiss, Investment in Technological Innovations: An 
Option Pricing Approach, 44 J. FIN. ECON. 397 (1997); John E. Core & Jun Qian, Option-like 
Contracts for Innovation and Production (University of Pennsylvania Financial Institutions Center 
Working Paper, January 2000). 
232. Agarwal et al., supra note 52, at 31. Specifically, Agarwal et al. found a positive and 
significant correlation between managerial ownership and performance such that a one standard 
deviation increase in ownership increases returns by an estimated 1.5 percent. Id. at 19. See also Cecile 
Le Moigne & Patrick Savaria, Relative Importance of Hedge Fund Characteristics, 20 FIN. MARKETS 
PORTFOLIO MGMT. 419, 424 (2006) (finding in a sample of 3,775 funds from 1989 to 2005 that funds 
with the personal capital of managers invested had higher returns). 
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manager becoming too cautious. 233 The optimal range of co-investment is an 
issue yet to be analyzed in-depth by empirical researchers. 234 
The impact of profit-based performance fees on performance cuts in two 
directions. Performance fees may benefit investors to the extent that they 
incentivize managers to innovate, expend more effort, and attract better talent 
to the industry. However, performance fees are a cost to investors in that they 
are deducted from increases in the value of their assets. Performance fees thus 
benefit investors so long as the incentive/talent-drawing effect results in net-of-
fee gains greater than the investors' alternative investment options. 235 In 
assessing the impact of performance fees on investors, a threshold issue is 
whether a performance-based fee structure reduces agency costs relative to 
investment funds that compensate managers solely based upon assets under 
management. The empirical evidence generally answers this question in the 
affirmative, finding that hedge fund performance fees in part account for their 
outperformance of mutuai funds (which cannot by law charge performance 
fees), 236 and that private investment funds that do not charge performance fees 
underperform those that do. 237 Performance-based compensation in hedge 
funds therefore seems to provide incentives that facilitate innovation beneficial 
to investors. 
When isolating the impact of the performance fee rate on performance, the 
empirical evidence is mixed. Most studies examining the issue find that hedge 
fund returns increase, as does the rate of the performance fee. 238 However, 
233. Roy Kouwenberg & William T. Ziemba, Incentives and Risk-Taking in Hedge Funds, 31 J. 
BANKING FIN. 3291 (2007) (concluding that "if the manager's own stake in the fund is substantial (e.g. 
> 30%), risk taking will be reduced considerably"); LHABITANT, supra note 15, at 33 (noting that "a 
successful fund manager at the end of his [or her] career will have so large a commitment in the fund 
that he [or she] will refrain from taking risks, even though these are well remunerated"). 
234. See Agarwal et al., supra note 52, at 19-20 (finding that very high managerial co-investment is 
correlated with negative but not statistically significant returns). 
235. William N. Goetzmann, Jonathan E. Ingersoll & Stephan A. Ross, High-Water Marks and 
Hedge Fund Management Contracts, 4 J. FIN. 1685, 1704-05 (2003) (discussing formal conditions 
under which performance fees are justified). 
236. Carl Ackermann, Richard McEnally & David Ravenscraft, The Performance of Hedge Funds: 
Risk, Return, and Incentives, 54 J. FIN. 833 (finding that in a sample of funds from 1988-1995, hedge 
funds consistently outperformed mutual funds in part because of incentive fees); Bing Liang, On the 
Performance of Hedge Funds, 55 FIN. ANAL. J. 72 (Jul/Aug 1999) (finding that hedge funds exhibit 
superior risk-adjusted returns as compared to mutual funds). 
237. Le Moigne & Savaria, supra note 232, at 424. But see Kouwenberg & Ziemba, supra note 
233, at 3308 (finding that "hedge funds with incentive fees have significantly lower mean returns (net of 
fees) and worse risk-adjusted performance"). 
238. Bing Liang, On the Performance of Hedge Funds, 55 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 72 (Jul/Aug 1999) 
(finding average hedge fund returns positively related to performance fees); William Fung & David A. 
Hsieh, Hedge-Fund Benchmarks: Information Content and Biases, 58 FIN. ANAL. J. 22 (2002); C. 
Ackermann, R. McEnally & D. Rosencraft, The Performance of Hedge Funds: Risk, Return and 
Incentives, 54 J. FIN. 833 (1999) (same); Franklin R. Edwards & Mustafe 0. Caglayan, Hedge Fund 
Performance and Manager Skill, 21 J. FUTURES MKTS. 1003 (2001) (same for a sample of funds from 
January 1990 to August 1998); Hung-Gay Fung, Xiaoqing Eleanor Xu & Jot Yau, Global Hedge Funds: 
Risk, Return, and Market Timing, 58 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 19 (2002) (same for sample of 115 equity funds 
from I 994 to 2000). 
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some studies find no relationship between incentive fee rate and 
performance. 239 The evidence is also mixed regarding the impact of 
performance fees on hedge fund survival, although no study finds that funds 
with higher incentive fees and high-water marks have an increased probability 
of failure. 240 These discrepancies may be attributable to the fact that hedge 
fund manager incentives are based not only upon the performance fee rate, but 
also on factors such as managerial co-investment, the presence of high-water 
marks and hurdle rates, and the timing of investments into the fund. After 
taking into account all of these incentives facing hedge fund managers, 
Agarwal et al. found that hedge funds perform better when total incentives are 
higher-in the presence of higher performance fees, more managerial co-
investment into the fund, and higher high-water marks. 241 
The existence of a high-water mark ensures that managers are not paid a 
performance fee unless they first produce a gain for investors, 242 and therefore 
creates a high-powered incentive to produce a positive return. Empirical studies 
have found that funds with high-water marks perform better than those without, 
which suggests that managers respond positively to the incentive. Using a 
sample of 8, 752 hedge funds from January 1990 to December 2005, Indraneel 
Chakraborty and Sugata Ray found that high-water marks seemed to induce 
managers at or just below the mark to expend more effort. 243 
However, the utilization of a high-water mark in conjunction with 
performance fees may cause the interests of hedge fund managers and investors 
to diverge in some instances. If a fund is significantly below its high-water 
239. Stephen J. Brown, William N. Goetzmann & Roger J. Ibbotson, Offshore Hedge Funds: 
Survival and Performance 1989-1995, 72 J. Bus. 91 (1999) (finding no relationship between incentive 
fee rates and performance); Thomas Schneeweis, Hossein Kazemi, & George Martin, Understanding 
Hedge Fund. Performance: Research Issues Revisited: Part/, 5 J. ALT. INV. 6 (2002) (finding little 
relationship between performance fees and returns in a group of long/short equity funds). 
240. BARTH et al., supra note 44, at 63-64 (finding that funds with higher management and 
performance fees are less likely to fail); Naohiko Baba & Hiromichi Goko, Survival Analysis of Hedge 
Funds 27 (Bank of Japan Working Paper, March 2006) (finding funds with higher performance fees are 
less likely to be operational); Guillermo Baquero, Jenketer Horst & Mamo Verbeek, Survival. Look-
Ahead Bias and the Performance of Hedge Funds, 40 J. FIN. QUANT. ANAL. 493, 504 (2005) (finding 
that "the higher the incentive fee, ceteris paribus, the more likely it is that the fund will liquidate in the 
next quarter"). 
241. Agarwal et al., supra note 52, at 6-7. See also Liang, supra note 238, at 74 (finding that funds 
with high-water marks outperformed funds without). In a separate study, Agarwal et al. found that hedge 
fund managers with higher incentives and opportunities to artificially manage their earnings may be 
doing so to improve performance results. Vikas Agarwal, Naveen D. Daniel & Narayan Y. Naik, Why is 
Santa So Kind to Hedge Funds? The December Return Puzzle 1-3 (Working Paper Marh 29, 2007). 
242. William N. Goetzmann, Jonathan E. Ingersoll & Stephan A. Ross, High-Water Marks and 
Hedge Fund Management Contracts, 4 J. FIN. 1685, 1686 (2003) (noting that "[h]igh-water mark 
contracts have the appealing feature of paying the manager a bonus only when the investors make a 
profit, and in addition, requiring that the manager make up any earlier losses before becoming eligible 
for the bonus payment"). 
243. lndraneel Chakraborty & Sugata Ray, Effort, Risk and Walkaway Under High Water Mark 
Style Contracts, 2, 20 (Oct. 29, 2008) (University of Pennsylvania Working Paper), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract= I 083089. See also Agarwal et al., supra note 52, at 17, 28, 31. 
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mark such that earning a performance fee requires a substantial gain by the end 
of the year, the manager might take on excessive risk and "swing for the 
fences" because either coming in at just below or far below the high-water 
mark will equally result in the manager not being paid a performance fee. 244 
Chakraborty and Ray found evidence of this effect: returns for funds I 0 percent 
below their high-water mark were more volatile than those at the mark, and 
funds further from the high-water mark took more and relatively poorer 
risks. 245 On the other hand, excessive risk-taking may be constrained by a 
desire to prevent the fund from collapsing, losing co-invested funds, or ending 
up far below the high-water mark in the first place. 246 Using a sample of 4,990 
hedge funds from January 1994 through December 2007, Andrew Clare and 
Nick Motson found that hedge fund managers well below their high-water 
mark do not increase their risk-taking activities even though doing so may 
jeopardize earning performance fees. 247 To prevent individual managers from 
leaving the employment of a fund well below its high-water mark, some hedge 
fund operating agreements allow for a reduced performance fee allocation even 
if the high-water mark is not achieved, and others reset the high-water mark at 
a level below that required for an investor to recoup losses. 248 
2. Jlliquidity Transaction Costs 
Investing is a transaction between an investor and a hedge fund where the 
investor purchases shares in exchange for an expected future gain. Greater 
restrictions on redemption increase the cost of the transaction to investors 
because the longer an investor is required to commit capital, the greater is the 
potential opportunity cost from not being able to deploy capital elsewhere and 
the greater is the risk an investor will not be able to exit if the hedge fund 
244. All About Alpha.com, New Research Illustrates Wide-ranging Implications of the Ubiquitous 
"High Water Mark," Jan. 21. 2008, available at http://allaboutalpha.com/blog/2008/0l/21/new-research-
illustrates-wide-ranging-implications-of-the-ubiquitous-high-water-mark/. At least one hedge fund 
manager has sought to assure investors that such an incentive would not affect her conduct by 
employing a compensation contract paying the performance fee every three years instead of annually. 
Jenny Anderson, Starting a Revolution in the Pay Structure for Hedge Fund Managers, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 17, 2006. 
245. Chakraborty & Ray, supra note 243, at 2. 
246. See Stavros Panageas & Mark M. Westerfield, High-Water Marks: High Risk Appetites? 
Convex Compensation, Long Horizons, and Portfolio Choice, J. FIN. 4, 14-15 (forthcoming 2009) 
(arguing through mathematical modeling that a desire to avoid falling below the high-water mark 
restrains hedge fund manager risk-taking), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1316667; James E. 
Hodder & Jens C. Jackwerth, Incentive Contracts and Hedge Fund Management, 42 J. FIN. QUANT. 
ANAL. 81 I (2007) (arguing through mathematical modeling that managerial co-investment induces 
managers to reduce risk as fund value fall below the high-water mark). 
247. Andrew Clare & Nick Motson, Locking in the Profits or Putting it All on Black? An 
Investigation into the Risk-Taking Behaviour of Hedge Fund Managers 3 (City University London - Sir 
John Cass Business School Working paper, Nov. 26, 2008), available at 
http://ssm.com/abstract= 1307713. 
248. LEDERMAN, supra note 17, at§ 2:3.3[C](I], 2-11-12. 
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experiences losses. Redemption restraints give hedge fund investments the 
quality of asset-specificity. Assets have specificity to the extent that they are 
committed to a particular investment and not easily redeployed to a different 
transaction. 249 As the seminal work of Oliver Williamson explains, asset-
specificity gives rise to transaction costs because uncertainty about future 
economic outcomes and the ability of parties to take advantage of each other 
leaves those owning investment specific assets vulnerable to unexpected 
changes in asset prices or opportunism by counterparties. 250 Likewise, when a 
hedge fund invests in illiquid assets the fund is itself vulnerable to losses if, 
before an investment realizes its full gains, investors prematurely withdraw 
funds or lenders demand additional collateral. Illiquid investments, which are 
not often traded, require more time than liquid investments for gains to be 
realized. 251 Consequently, hedge funds lock in capital as a governance device 
to prevent capital withdrawals so managers can exert the control required to 
capitalize on their illiquid investments. 252 
Although the limitations hedge funds place on capital redemptions impose a 
transaction costs on investors, a tradeoff is that these limitations are associated 
with the benefit of higher returns. Empirical studies suggest that redemption 
restrictions allow hedge funds to successfully implement relatively long-term 
investment strategies involving illiquid assets without having to prematurely 
return capital to investors. 253 As a result, investors are compensated with higher 
returns in exchange for bearing transaction costs from redemption 
restrictions. 254 This illiquidity premium in part reflects a return to innovation. 
Innovative companies generally foster asset-specificity to increase 
performance. 255 Maintaining a sufficiently long commitment to innovative 
activity is necessary to earn a positive return on the underlying investment 
because the benefits of innovation may not pay off immediately.256 Lock-ups 
249. Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual 
Relations, 22 J. LAW. ECON. POL. 233, 255 (1979) (stating that "asset specificity refers to durable 
investments that are undertaken in support of particular transactions, the opportunity costs of which 
investments is much lower in best alternative uses or by alternative users should the original transaction 
be prematurely terminated"). 
250. Id. at 251-54 (noting that a "critical dimension" for describing contractual relations is the 
degree to which investments are asset specific). 
251. LEDERMAN, supra note 17, at§ 2:2.3[D][I], 2-14; George A. Aragon, Share Restrictions and 
Asset Pricing: Evidence from the Hedge Fund Industry, 8 J. FIN. ECON. 33, 34 (2007) (arguing that 
"share restrictions allow funds to efficiently manage illiquid assets"). 
252. See also Ribstein, supra note 19, at 10 (noting that capital lock-in is a feature required for all 
successful firms). 
253. Agaiwal et al., supra note 52, at 18; BARTH et al., supra note 44, at 63-64. 
254. See Agaiwal et al., supra note 52, at 18; Liang, supra note 238, at 78 (finding hedge fund 
performance to be higher the longer the lock-up period); Aragon, supra note 251, at 34. 
255. See O'SULLIVAN, supra note 141, at 33. 
256. Id. at 20, 60 (financial commitment consists of institutions that "support the ongoing access of 
a business organization to the financial resources required to undertake and sustain the development and 
utilization of productive resources until such a time as these resources can generate returns"); 
Holmstrom, supra note 226, at 309; Benn Lawson & Danny Samson, Developing Innovation Capability 
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and other restrictions on investor share redemption facilitate financial 
commitment which, in tum, can promote innovation by giving the fund enough 
time to benefit from a new illiquid investment strategy. Although hedge fund 
liquidity restrictions may only delay redemption by several months, such 
restrictions are long-term relative to hedge fund active investment strategies 
and thereby allow the funds enough time to capture the gains from innovation. 
3. Lack of Public Financing 
A third hedge fund governance device is the need to obtain and keep 
investor capital. Because hedge fund securities are privately issued, 257 the 
funds do not have access to the relatively stable sources of external capital 
provided by the public secondary markets or the reputational benefits of being 
publicly listed on a stock exchange. Accordingly, fund managers have a strong 
incentive to engage in those activities necessary to obtain and prevent 
withdrawal of capital from investors. The basic business model of a hedge fund 
derives from a manager believing that he or she "has a set of skills that could 
earn above average risk adjusted returns."258 The type of skill required for a 
successful hedge fund is skill in generating new and unique knowledge about 
the future prices of financial instruments or other assets, or skill in generating 
trading strategies to better exploit existing information about the prices of 
financial instruments. This business model can only be successful if the fund 
innovates by continually developing and implementing valuable, unique, and 
not-easily-copied investment strategies. 259 
First, because any particular hedge fund strategy will typically become less 
profitable as the fund grows in size and more capital is devoted to the 
strategy, 260 hedge funds must implement new investment strategies to be able 
to increase assets under management without reducing returns and hence 
performance-based fees. Second, competitive pressures in the hedge fund 
industry also drive innovation. Barriers to entry in the hedge fund industry are 
low. 261 As additional managers enter the industry and capital continues to flow 
in Organizations: A Dynamic Capabilities Approach, 5 INT'L J. INNOVATION MGMT. 377, 4 (2001) 
(Business Source Premier database version, on file with author) (arguing that "innovation is a force of 
instability, often requiring long-term vision and commitment to yield results"). 
257. See supra Section l.D. I. 
258. Fung & Hsieh, supra note 211, at 2 (emphasis in original). 
259. See generally Jay Barney, Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage, 17 J. 
MGMT. 99 (1991). 
260. Manuel Ammann & Patrick Moerth, Impact of Fund Size on Hedge Fund Performance, 16 
(Working Paper Series in Finance Paper No. 11, Sept. 2005) (finding "a negative relationship between 
fund sizes and returns"); Le Moigne & Savaria, supra note 237, at 419-20 (reviewing literature on 
performance and fund size and finding mixed results); Naryan Y. Naik et al., Capacity Constraints and 
Hedge Fund Strategy Returns, 13 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 239 (2007) (finding increases in capital to funds 
decreases their performance); LHABITANT, supra note 15, at 520. 
261. LEDERMAN, supra note 17, at § I :4.2, 1-21-1-23. 
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into the funds, superior returns may decrease as new participants compete away 
profits. 262 Furthermore, even though hedge fund managers often go to great 
lengths to protect their proprietary strategies and investment positions, 263 the 
superior returns obtained by a particular hedge fund trading strategy may be 
short-lived as rival managers and other traders discover and imitate the trading 
strategies of each other. 264 There are also an increasing array of low-cost close 
substitutes for hedge funds, such as mutual funds that use hedge fund-like 
strategies, and synthetic hedge fund "clones" potentially able to replicate the 
returns of mediocre hedge funds. 265 Because hedge fund investors are relatively 
quick to withdraw capital from underperforming funds, 266 increasing 
competition places a greater importance on innovating to provide a unique 
service to investors. Indeed, the relatively high attrition rates in the industry, 
which are in large part attributable to funds voluntarily closing for failure to 
meet investment objectives, reflect the importance of outperforming rivals. 267 
Finally, hedge funds must innovate as part of their overall strategy to keep 
up with a constantly changing economic world. 268 Financial innovation is often 
262. William Fung et al., Hedge Funds: Performance, Risk and Capital Formation 19 (July 19, 
2006) (AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper) (finding "that following significant inflow of capital in the 
industry, the level of alpha has come down substantially in recent years"), available at 
http://ssm.com/abstract=778124. 
263. See, e.g., Gregory Zuckerman, Trader Made Billions on Subprime, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2008, 
at Al; RICHARD BOOKSTABER, DEMONS OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND THE 
PERILS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION 184 (describing how sellers can mask trades by employing securities 
dealers). 
264. BOOKSTABER, supra note 263, at 195 (noting the risk of a fund's positions being traded 
against once known by others). 
265. Vikas Agarwal, Nicole M. Boyson & Narayan Y. Naik, Hedge Funds for Retail Investors? An 
Examination of Hedged Mutual Funds, J. FIN. QUANT. ANAL. (forthcoming), available at 
http://ssm.com/abstract=891621; William Fung & David A. Hsieh, Hedge Fund Replication Strategies: 
Implications for Investors and Regulators, 10 FIN. STABILITY REV., Banque de France 55, April 2007; 
Marc Hogan, Hedge Funds: Attack of the Clones, BUSINESSWEEK.COM, Dec. 4, 2006. 
266. Vikas Agarwal et al., Flows, Performance, and Managerial Incentives in Hedge Funds 30 
(July 22, 2004) (EFA 2003 Annual Conference Working Paper No. 501) (finding that "money-flows 
chase good recent performance"); Bill Ding et al., Market Volatility, Investor Flows, and the Structure 
of Hedge Fund Markets 3 (Working Paper, November 6, 2006) (finding evidence that hedge fund 
investors are "smart" such that they have skill in allocating capital to funds that perform above-average); 
Guillermo Baquero & Mamo Verbeek, A Portrait of Hedge Fund Investors: Flows, Performance and 
Smart Money 6-7 (EFA 2006 Zurich Meetings Paper, November 14, 2007) (finding that hedge funds 
investors rapidly withdraw capital from underperforming funds), available at 
http://ssm.com/abstract=773384. 
267. Nicholas T. Chan et al., Systemic Risk and Hedge Funds, in THE RISKS OF FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 249-50 (Mark S. Carey&, Rene M. Stulz eds. 2006); Stuart Feffer & Christopher Kundro, 
Understanding and Mitigating Operational Risk in Hedge Fund Investments Capco, The Capital Markets 
Company Ltd. (2003). 
268. See RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC 
CHANGE 128-34 (1982); Astrid H. Lassen, Frank Gertsen & Jens 0. Riis, The Nexus of Corporate 
Entrepreneurship and Radical Innovation, 15 CREATIVITY INNOVATION MGMT. 359, 366 (2006) 
(arguing that the "flexibility" required for innovation entails both "the ability to react quickly to 
changes" and "the ability to incorporate change as a continuous consideration in the organization" such 
that change "is perceived as a natural process"); Mark Casson, Entrepreneurship and the Theory of the 
Firm, 58 J. ECON. BEHAV. ORG. 327, 333 (2005) ("Competition is also a source of volatility .... 
[ e ]ntrepreneurs need to monitor the launch of their rivals' initiatives so that they can neutralize their 
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a response to broad macroeconomic changes in general price levels, interest 
d h . 269 A d. 1 . rates, an currency exc ange ratios. ccor mg y, greater macroeconomic 
instability will tend to spur more financial innovation, often in an attempt to 
reduce the risks from such change.270 Hedge funds' short-term trading 
strategies are exposed to and dependent upon continual and rapid changes in 
their economic environment. There are nonstop changes in the value of the 
investment positions taken by the funds and the risk factors to which they are 
exposed. These changes must be continually monitored and often require 
managers to make incremental innovations to their investment strategies to 
attain their objectives. 271 
C. Alpha and the Hedge Fund Legal Regime 
Notwithstanding the generally higher company-specific risks of hedge 
funds, their lower exposures to market risk and downside risk means that hedge 
funds can help to diversify an investment portfolio and lower overall risk. 272 
Indeed, numerous studies document that hedge funds produce superior risk-
adjusted returns (alpha) relative to traditional long-only investments. 273 Hedge 
impacts quickly."). 
269. See W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. White, Empirical Studies of Financial Innovation: lots of 
Talk, little Action?, 42 J. ECON. LIT. 116, 120 (2004). 
270. Id. 
271. See ARMELLE GUIZOT, THE HEDGE FUND COMPLIANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDE 44-
54 (2007). 
272. A large body of academic finance literature supports the proposition that hedge funds lower 
the risk of traditional portfolios despite the funds' relatively higher company-specific risk. See Jean-
Fran~ois Bacmann & Gregor Gawron, Fat-Tail Risk in Portfolio of Hedge Funds and Traditional 
Investment, in HEDGE FUND INSIGHTS, supra note 217, at 491-513 (demonstrating that "the risk of a 
traditional portfolio is reduced when hedge funds are added"); R. McFall Lamm Jr., Asymmetric Returns 
and Optimal Hedge Fund Portfolios, J. ALT. INVESTMENTS 6, 9-21 (2003) ("(O]ptimal hedge fund 
portfolios should have up to a 30% smaller allocation to distressed debt than symmetric return models 
indicate ... offset by larger allocations to equity market neutral, rotational, and systematic macro 
strategies, which produce more positively skewed portfolios."); Jan-Hein Cremers, Mark Kritzman & 
Sebastien Page, Optimal Hedge Fund Allocations: Do Higher Moments Matter?, 32 J. PORTFOLIO 
MGMT. 70, 70 (2005) (finding that "higher moments of hedge funds do not meaningfully compromise 
the efficacy of mean-variance optimization" where investors are generally risk averse); Niclas Hagelin, 
Bengt Pramborg & Fredrik Stenberg, Hedge Fund Allocation under Higher Moments and llliquidity, in 
HEDGE FUND INSIGHTS, supra note 217, at 105-128 (finding that "gains from allocating into hedge funds 
occur even when possible effects of deviations from normality"); Jean Brunel, Revisiting the Role of 
Hedge Funds in Diversified Portfolios, in HEDGE FUND INSIGHTS, supra note 217, at 129-49 (concluding 
that despite hedge funds' unique risks, "there is indeed a role for nontraditional, hedge fund-type 
strategies in diversified portfolios"); lvilina Popova et al., Optimal Hedge Fund Allocation with 
Asymmetric Preferences and Distributions (May I, 2006) (Seattle University Economics & Finance 
Working Paper) (showing "that conditional on the investor's objective, a substantial allocation to hedge 
funds is justified even with consideration for the highly unusual skewness and kurtosis"), available at 
http://ssm.com/abstract=900012. Of course, how and to what extent adding hedge funds to a traditional 
portfolio of stocks and bonds decreases risk depends on several factors, such as what assets the portfolio 
is already composed of and what particular hedge funds are added. See Bacmann & Gawron supra note 
272, at 512 ("[T]he benefits of the inclusion of hedge funds in a traditional portfolio depend on the 
initial composition of the portfolio and on the type of hedge fund added to the portfolio."); Lhabitant & 
Learned, supra note 217, at 3-4. 
273. See Robert Kosowski, Narayan Y. Naik & Melvin Teo, Do Hedge Funds Deliver Alpha? A 
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fund alpha therefore reflects the gains to investors from hedge fund innovation. 
One likely source of hedge fund alpha are the superior investment skills of 
hedge fund managers. 274 Another likely source of alpha are the unique 
systematic risk exposures that hedge funds are exposed to by pursuing 
innovative investment strategies. 275 This is because hedge funds can earn 
superior returns from taking on unique systematic risks. 276 Hedge funds' 
utilization of innovative strategies is, in tum, due in part to the hedge fund legal 
regime, which enables and provides incentives for managers to take on unique 
systematic risks. Accordingly, some combination of hedge funds being 
excluded from the Company Act and operating subject to the incentives 
provided by their uncorporate governance devices explains the superior 
performance of the funds. 277 In that respect, the hedge fund legal regime is a 
source of hedge fund alpha. 
III. HEDGE FUNDS AND INVESTOR PROTECTION 
The ability of hedge funds to reduce the risk of loss to investment portfolios 
bears an important relationship to a fundamental policy objective of U.S. 
securities law. By disclosing material information and reducing the exposure of 
investment capital to losses, hedge funds complement the legislative and 
regulatory objective of investor protection. 
Bayesian and Bootstrap Analysis, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 229, 262-63 (2007); Bill Ding & Hany A. Shawky, 
The Performance of Hedge Fund Strategies and the Asymmetry of Return Distributions, 13 EUR. FIN. 
MGMT. 309, 329 (2007) (finding that from 1990 to 2003, all hedge fund categories achieved above 
average performance when measured against an aggregate equity market index); Robert Peng Chen & 
Roger G. Ibbotson, The A,B,Cs of Hedge Funds: Alphas, Betas, and Costs 14, Yale !CF Working Paper 
No. 06-10, Sept. 2006, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=733264; Harry M. Kat & Joelle Miffre, The 
Impact of Non-Normality Risks and Tactical Trading on Hedge Fund Alphas, 16-17 (May 24, 2006) 
(Cass Business School Finance Working Paper) (finding the representative hedge fund manager to have 
superior trading skills but noting that previous studies and their own may overstate alpha), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=424368; Capocci & Hiibner, supra note 209, at 77 (finding that hedge funds as 
a whole "[ d]eliver significant excess returns"). 
274. Studies finding a lack of long-term and industry-wide persistence in performance by hedge 
fund managers undermine the notion that superior performance on an industry-wide basis is solely a 
result of manager skill. See Martin Eling, Does Hedge Fund Performance Persist? Overview and New 
Empirical Evidence, EURO. FIN. MGMT. (forthcoming 2009). See also John M. Griffin & Jin Xu, How 
Smart are the Smart Guys? A Unique View from Hedge Fund Stock Holdings, AFA 2008 New Orleans 
Meetings Working Paper (finding that hedge fund managers are not better at picking stocks than mutual 
fund managers), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=924242. 
275. See generally Rajna Gibson & Songtao Wang, Hedge Fund Alphas: Do They Reflect 
Managerial Skills or Mere Compensation for Liquidity Risk Bearing? (Swiss Finance Institute Research 
Paper No. 08-37, 2008) (finding that hedge fund alpha is a return for making illiquid investments), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1304541. 
276. In the context of providing an alternative to manager skill as an explanation for superior hedge 
fund performance, hedge fund systematic risk exposures are often referred to as "alternative beta." See 
Roman Tancar & Jan Viebeg, Alternative Beta Applied-An Introduction to Hedge Fund Replication, 
FIN. MARKETS PORTFOLIO MGMT. 259, 260-63 (2008). 
277. See Duen-Li Kao, Battle for Alphas: Hedge Funds Versus long-Only Portfolios, 52 FIN. 
ANALYSTS. J. 16, 23-25 (2002) (describing how hedge funds' unique legal structure may explain the 
author's finding that hedge funds outperform long-only portfolios). 
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A. Diversification and Investor Protection 
Investor protection is a hallmark goal of federal secunttes law and an 
animating principle of the SEC. 278 Investor protection means protecting 
investors from economic losses stemming from fraud and more subtle forms of 
opportunism by issuers, traders, and other market participants. The legislative 
history of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act demonstrates that Congress 
was concerned with ordinary investors being subjected to fraud, inadequate 
disclosure, and manipulation of stock prices. 279 The primary means by which 
U.S. securities law protects investors is by mandating the "full and fair 
disclosure of the character of securities,"280 combined with liability for fraud or 
violations of specific disclosure requirements. 281 The purpose of the disclosure 
regime is not to prevent investors from taking on "too much" risk, but rather to 
protect investors by enabling them to make informed investment decisions 
based upon accurate, complete, and timely company disclosures. 282 
From the perspective of financial economics, the ultimate goal of investor 
278. See, e.g., Securities Act § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2000) ("Whenever pursuant to this 
subchapter the [Securities and Exchange] Commission is engaged in rulemaking and is required to 
consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the 
Commission shall ... consider ... the protection of investors .... "); Securities and Exchange Act § 
3(t), 15 U.S.C. 78f(a) (2000) (stating substantially same); Investment Company Act§ 2(c), 15 U.S.C. 
80a-2c (2000) (stating substantially same). 
279. C. Edward Fletcher Ill, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal Securities laws, 6 DUKE L. 
J. 1081, 1133-34 (1988). See also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 n.10 (1980) ("The 
essential objective of securities legislation is to protect those who do not know market conditions from 
the overreachings of those who do."); Phillip A. Loomis, Jr., The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 214, 226 (1959-1960) (noting that periodic 
reporting under the Exchange Act "is an essential part of the effort to remedy abuses in exchange 
trading" because "the absence of public disclosure of the facts facilitates manipulation, speculation on 
inside information, and other improper practices"); Exchange Act§§ 8-11, 16, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78h-j, 78j-
I, 78p (2000) (prohibiting manipulative and abusive trading practices by insiders, speculators and 
others). 
280. Securities Act, Preamble. 
281. LOUIS Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 30 (4th ed. 
2001) (noting that the results of the Securities Act are "primarily twofold" in that the "disclosure 
requirement will in itself prevent from fraudulent transactions" in addition to the Act's "stringent civil 
liability provisions"). 
282. See S. Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. I (1933) (noting that the "basic policy [of the 
Securities Act] is that of informing the investors of the facts concerning securities to be offered for sale 
in interstate and foreign commerce and providing protection against fraud and misrepresentation"); SEC 
v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 ( 1953) ("The design of the (Securities Act] is to protect 
investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment 
decisions."); Company Act § l(b)(I), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b)(I) (2000); John E. Tracy & Alfred B. 
MacChesney, The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 32 MICH. L. REV. 1025, 1048 (1934) (noting 
that the Exchange Act disclosure requirements facilitate accurate "evaluation of prices of securities"); 
Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 876, (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that the purpose of the Advisers Act is to 
"'substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor' in the investment 
advisory profession") (quoting SEC. v. Capital Gains Research Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)); Phillip 
A. Loomis, Jr., The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 28 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 214, 245 (1959) (noting the registration and disclosure requirements of the Advisers Act 
sought to provide "a compulsory census of investment advisers and which would provide in small 
degree for the regulation of some of their activities") (internal quotation omitted). 
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protection regulation is the maximization of risk-adjusted returns: mandating 
truthful disclosures enables investors to minimize losses by making informed 
choices about the potential risks and rewards of purchasing certain securities. 
Disclosure helps to inform investors about the market risk of securities, and 
thereby facilitates successful diversification. In this way, investors are not 
protected against losses per se, but only against those losses whose underlying 
risk is not priced into the security in the form of a higher return. 
Prohibiting fraud also facilitates the maximization of risk-adjusted returns. 
Even though fraud is a type of idiosyncratic risk that can be minimized through 
diversification, fraud undermines investor protection in part because it may 
misinform investors about the market risk of securities and thereby prevent 
efficient portfolio diversification. Because investment losses reduce investor 
wealth regardless of whether they stem from fraud or investment risk, to the 
extent financial innovation enables investors to diversify their portfolios and 
reduce losses, innovation also facilitates investor protection. Since hedge funds 
are uniquely able to diversify a portfolio from market risks, the funds advance 
the same goal sought by investor protection regulation. 
B. Hedge Fund Disclosures 
Hedge funds are relatively opaque investment vehicles because they are not 
subject to public registration or disclosure requirements and managers often 
keep their particular investment strategies and positions private. 283 However, as 
a matter of law and practice, the funds typically make disclosures sufficient for 
investors to make informed investment decisions. 
There are two legal grounds for hedge fund disclosure. First, hedge funds 
are subject to liability under the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, and the 
Advisers Act for making fraudulent or misleading statements. 284 As interpreted 
by U.S. courts, a fund making some disclosures must also make additional 
disclosures to ensure that its communications are not misleading. 285 Second, 
hedge funds usually make private offerings under the requirements of Rule 506 
and according to the judicially-defined statutory section 4(2) exemption. 286 
This latter exemption requires hedge funds to disclose to investors the type of 
283. Benjamin S. Bemanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Hedge Funds 
and Systemic Risk, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta's 2006 Financial Markets 
Conference (May 16, 2006), (transcript available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bemanke200605 l 6a.htm) (noting that "[i]t is 
commonly observed that hedge funds are 'opaque'-that is, information about their portfolios is 
typically limited and infrequently provided"). 
284. See supra Section l.C.2 and Section l.D. l. 
285. See First Virginia Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1317 (5th Cir. 1977) (noting that "a 
duty to speak the full truth arises when a defendant undertakes a duty to say anything"). 
286. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
286 
The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds 
information contained in a Securities Act registration statement.287 
Accordingly, to fulfill their obligations under federal law, hedge funds must 
make true, accurate, and comprehensive disclosures to investors. 288 
There are also economic incentives for hedge funds to make disclosures. To 
satisfy investors while fulfilling their legal duties under the antifraud laws and 
section 4(2), hedge funds typically furnish directly to potential investors a 
private placement memorandum (PPM). 289 A PPM is a widely utilized form 
disclosure which contains the type of information that would be provided by a 
registration statement publicly filed under section 5 of the Securities Act, along 
with the unique facts and circumstances surrounding the fund. 290 Accordingly, 
hedge funds typically disclose the following information in connection with a 
private placement: a basic description of the fund including its investment 
objectives, strategies, and the types of securities the fund purchases; risks 
pertaining to the funds' investment strategy and regulatory and tax issues; a 
description of how fees arc calculated and potential conflicts of interest by the 
managers and other principals; a summary of the terms of the fund, how it is 
managed and organized, and how investors can redeem shares; and financial 
statements including net asset value and how that value is calculated. 291 Hedge 
funds also make periodic disclosures to investors, with one survey finding that 
89 percent of surveyed hedge fund managers made at least monthly disclosures 
to investors. 292 Hedge funds typically utilize third parties such as prime 
brokers, custodians, and administrators that have direct access to the fund's 
investment positions and the ability to verify the fund's true investment 
returns. 293 Third parties such as Morningstar are also increasingly making 
287. See supra note 112. 
288. LEDERMAN, supra note 17, at§ 4:2.2, 4-12 (noting that "in light of various federal and state 
anti-fraud provisions, a well advised hedge fund prepares a comprehensive offering memorandum, even 
if the offering is directed solely to accredited investors, to ensure that all material information is 
conveyed"); HAMMER ET AL., supra note 19, at 4 (same). 
289. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 46 ("Most hedge funds provide written information to 
their investors in the form of a private offering memorandum or private placement memorandum 
.... "); HAMMER ET AL., supra note 19, at 118 ("Instead of merely providing access to information 
[similar to what would be provided by a registration statement], the issuer may furnish directly the 
information that would be provided by a registration statement, as in a private offering memorandum 
that fully discloses such information."). 
290. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 47-49 (noting the information typically disclosed in a 
PPM); HAMMER ET AL., supra note 19, at 118 ("A hedge fund's private offering memorandum should 
contain all the information required in a registration statement .... "); LEDERMAN, supra note 17, at§ 
4:2.2, 4-13. 
291. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 47-49; LEDERMAN, supra note 17, at§ 4:2.2, 4-13-14; 
HAMMER ET AL., supra note 19, at 144-58. 
292. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, TRANSPARENCY VERSUS RETURNS: THE INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTOR VIEW OF ALTERNATIVE ASSETS 50 (March 2008). See also Email from Bruce Gibney & Alda 
Leu, Clarium Capital Management LLC to Nancy M. Morris, Secretary, Securities and Exchange 
Commission at 5 (Mar. 9, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/s72506-566.pdf 
(stating that "[i]t is routine for hedge funds to provide monthly reports [to investors], and many provide 
weekly and even daily reports of performance"). 
293. LHABITANT, supra note 15, at 93-103. The antifraud law applicable to hedge funds and their 
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public information relevant to evaluating and investing in different hedge 
funds, such as performance history, fees, and different measures of risk. 294 
Furthermore, as competition for investor capital increases and investors 
become more sophisticated and comfortable with the funds, investors are 
increasingly demanding that hedge funds disclose information about the types 
of investments they make, their risk management policies, and other 
practices. 295 Indeed, hedge funds, their investors, and third parties such as trade 
groups are increasingly recommending substantial transparency as a best 
practice. 296 As the industry becomes more prominent and institutionalized, and 
as competition for investors grows, hedge funds are likely to further expand 
and standardize disclosures to avoid liability and meet investor demand. 297 This 
is especially the case after the subprime-initiated financial crisis and the 
Madoff scandal, which have likely served to make investors especially wary of 
d. l 29s opaque manager 1sc osures. 
C. Hedge Funds and Protection from Financial Losses 
Based upon their historical returns, hedge funds have furthered the same 
goal that investor protection regulation seeks to advance by helping investors 
maximize risk-adjusted returns. When added to a traditional portfolio of stocks 
and bonds, hedge funds can decrease overall investment risk. 299 Indeed, in 
some circumstances investing in a diversified portfolio of hedge funds may be 
superior to holding any traditional investments whatsoever. 300 
utilization of independent service providers provides substantial, though certainly not perfect, assurances 
against fraud. See Chidem Kurdas, Does Regulation Prevent Fraud? The Case of Manhattan Hedge 
Fund, 13 INDEPENDENT REV. 325, 326-27 (2009). For example, the multibillion dollar securities fraud 
carried out by Bernard Madoff was possible in part because Madoff did not manage a hedge fund and 
did not utilize independent services providers. Felix Salmon, Can Hedge Funds Be Fraudulent?, 
Potfolio.com, Dec. 15, 2008. 
294. Jeff Benjamin, Hedge Funds Go Prime Time, INVESTMENTNEWS, Feb. 28, 2008; Morningstar, 
Hedge Fund Database, Overview, available at 
http://corporate.momingstar.com/US/asp/subject.aspx?xmlfile=545.xml 
295. Indeed, most hedge fund advisers voluntarily register and submit to the disclosure obligations 
of the Advisers Act to attract investors. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 19, at 17 (noting that "some 
investment advisers choose to register with the SEC to gain whatever marketing cachet SEC registration 
might afford"); SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 22 n.76; HFR, Hedge Fund Research Releases 
Data on Number of Hedge Fund Firms Registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Feb. 
2, 2009 (finding that approximately 55 percent of U.S.-based hedge funds are registered with the SEC 
and that 60 percent of global hedge fund assets are managed by SEC-registered funds), available at 
http://www.hedgefundresearch.com/pdf/pr_20090202.pdf. 
296. Notably, investors do not typically demand and best practices do not recommend position-
level transparency. Nor would such information be generally useful to investors. See, e.g., The Bank of 
New York, Casey, Quirk, and Associates, Institutional Demand for Hedge Funds 2: A Global 
Perspective 10 (2006); BOOKSTABER, supra note 263, at 220-21, 225-26. 
297. The Hedge Fund JOO, INST. INVESTOR, June 2002; Christine Williamson, Institutional Interest 
lights Transparency Fire, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Oct. 15, 2007. 
298. See supra note 9. 
299. See supra Section II.A. 
300. See Todd Brulhard & Peter Klein, Faulty Hypotheses and Hedge Funds, CAN. INVESTMENT 
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1. Performance in the Modern Hedge Fund industry 
The hedge fund industry did not exist in its current form until the mid-
l 990s. Before that time, the industry was less than l percent of its current size, 
operations were less standardized and sophisticated, and data about industry-
wide performance was less easily available. 301 Since the mid- l 980s, average 
industry-wide returns have been approximately 9 percent. 302 Since the late-
l 990s, there have been three periods where either overall markets, or specific 
systematic risk factors, caused economy-wide losses and tested the ability of 
hedge funds to offer protection against market fluctuations. First was the 
Russian debt crisis of 1998. On August 17, 1998, the government of Russia 
caused massive fluctuations in systematic risk factors by devaluing its currency 
and defaulting on its debt, among other actions. 303 These economic shocks 
caused losses in many large hedge funds and ultimately led to a $3.6 billion 
private rescue of the now-infamous hedge fund Long Term Capital 
Management (L TCM). 304 Yet despite L TCM's losses, in August 1998 hedge 
funds as a whole fared better than the market, losing 7.75 percent compared to 
a loss of 14.46 percent for the S&P 500. 305 
A second period testing the ability of hedge funds to provide protection 
against market downturns was the recession from 2000 to 2002 following the 
crash of the technology bubble. Figure 2 compares average yearly hedge fund 
returns to those of the general market from 1997 to 2007. 306 As Figure 2 
illustrates, hedge fund returns, while often lower than market returns on an 
REV. 6, 10-11 (2005) (concluding that large allocations to hedge funds are appropriate because extreme 
returns are larger among stock indices than hedge fund indices}, available at www.aima-
canada.org/doc _ bin/S UMM ER2005 _ aimawinner.pdf. 
30 I. BARTH ET AL., supra note 44, at 4 (listing total assets of hedge funds by year from 1981 to 
June 2006); Mercer Oliver Wyman, New Study Reveals Strengthened Global Hedge Fund Industry Risk 
Management Practices and Highlights Areas for Improvement (2006), available at 
http:l/www .oliverwyman.com/ow/pdf _files/Global_ Hedge_ Fund_ RM_ MOW_ 0606.pdf. 
302. See, e.g., Kat & Miffre, supra note 273, at 7-8 (finding an annualized average return from 
hedge funds of 12 percent from January 1985 to August 2004). See also Chen & Ibbotson, supra note 
273, at 16 (finding the compounded annual return for hedge funds from 1995 to April 2006 to be 9 
percent). 
303. LHABITANT,supra note 15, at 16. 
304. HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, 
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS 14 ( 1999). 
305. LHABITANT, supra note 15, at 525, fig. 23.10. 
306. Returns for the S&P 500 were obtained from EconStats, S&P 500 (Large Cap) Index, 
available at http:l/www.econstats.com/eqty/eqea_mi_l.htm. Hedge fund annual returns are based upon 
the EDHEC Funds of Funds index, which is the return to a diversified portfolio of hedge funds. See 
EDHEC Alternative Index, Funds of Funds, available at http:l/www.edhec-
risk.com/indexes/pure _style/downloads/one _page_ sumrnary _reports/fof.pdf. For annualized returns 
from 1997 to 2007 see Veronique Le Sourd, Hedge Fund Performance in 2008, EDHEC Risk and Asset 
Management Research Centre I 0 (2009), available at http://docs.edhec-
risk.com/mrk/090220 _Publication/EDHEC _Publication_HF _Performance _in_ 2008.pdf. Using funds of 
hedge funds returns is a sound method to approximate average hedge fund performance. See Fung & 
Hsieh, supra note 211, at 15 (noting that funds of hedge funds "are actual pools of hedge funds, and, as 
such, they directly reflect actual investment experience in hedge funds"). 
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absolute basis, preserved investor wealth when the broader market was 
negative. From 2000 to 2002, the average return of the S&P 500 Index was a 
negative 15.5 percent whereas the average annual return for hedge funds during 
the same period was a gain of approximately 4.2 percent. 
Figure 2: Hedge Fund Mean Annual Returns Compared to U.S. Equity 
Market Returns from 1997 to 2007 
Sources: EconStats, Le Sourd (2009). 
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In addition to offering protection from annual stock market losses, hedge 
funds as a class have also offered protection from losses on a monthly basis. 
Returns to hedge funds are typically higher than those of the stock market in 
months when the market returns a loss. 307 By one estimate, from January 1994 
to December 2005, the S&P 500 averaged a loss of 3.53 percent during down-
months whereas the average monthly hedge fund return during those same 
months was a loss of only 0.30 percent. 308 
2. Hedge Fund Peiformance During the Financial Crisis 
The third major test of the hedge fund industry began in late 2007 as losses 
from the U.S. subprime mortgage market initiated a global financial crisis. A 
subprime mortgage is a home loan to a borrower without the requisite measure 
of creditworthiness to qualify for a lower interest "prime" mortgage; hence, this 
307. CRESTMONT RESEARCH, PERSPECTIVES ON HEDGE FUND INVESTING 18 (2007), available at 
http://www.crestmontresearch.com/pdfs/HF%20Industry%20Presentation.pdf. 
308. LHABITANT,supra note 15, at 523-25, fig. 23.8. 
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type of loan has a higher probability of delinquency or default. 309 Due 
principally to a slowdown in housing appreciation in 2006, delinquencies and 
defaults in the previously growing number of subprime loans began to sharply 
increase in 2006. 310 Losses on subprime mortgages spread not only to the 
banks that made the loans, but also to other financial institutions such as 
investment banks, mutual funds, pension funds, and hedge funds. These 
institutions invested in securities backed by mortgages (mortgage-backed 
securities) and securities themselves backed by mortgaged-backed securities 
(known as collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs ). 311 Because subprime-
related losses caused market participants to question the value of all types of 
debt securities and the creditworthiness of financial institutions, a "credit 
crunch" ensued as lenders substantially curtailed their lending activities, and 
the issuance and trading of CDOs and other debt securities dramatically 
decreased. 312 Through September 2008, global financial institutions lost a total 
of $760 billion from writing down the value of loan assets including debt 
. . b k db 313 securities ac e y mortgages. 
Hedge funds were not immune to the financial crisis. 314 In 2008, hedge 
funds suffered the worst losses in their history. Hedge funds lost 19 percent and 
their investors withdrew a record $158.91 billion in capital. 315 The industry 
shrank in 2008 by nearly one-third from withdrawals and investment losses to 
end the year with $1.8 trillion in assets under management. 316 Investors in 
several large and prominent hedge funds such as those sponsored and managed 
by Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Citadel, and Peloton Partners either 
experienced massive losses or were completely wiped out, and others were 
309. John Ki ff & Paul Mills, Money for Nothing and Checks for Free: Recent Developments in U.S. 
Subprime Mortgage Markets 3 (Int'! Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/07/188 July 2007). 
310. Id. at 7-9. 
311. IMF, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT FINANCIAL STRESS AND DELEVERAGING 
MACRO-FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY 35 Box 1.4 (October 2008) (displaying investors in 
mortgage-related securities), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/gfsr/2008/02/pdf/text.pdf.; 
BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (BIS), BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, THE 
JOINT FORUM, CREDIT RISK TRANSFER, DEVELOPMENTS FROM 2005 TO 2007, 9-10, 16-17 (July 2008) 
(describing COO investors), available at http://www.fsforum.org/publications/r _ 0804c.pdf?noframes= I. 
312. Pierre Paulden et al., Wall Street Abandons Neediest Clients, Cuts Credit, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 
2008; Jody Shenn, CDO Market is Almost Frozen, JPMorgan, Merrill Say, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 5, 2008. 
313. IMF,supranote311,at 15-17. 
314. Hedge funds did not initiate the crisis nor seem to have meaningfully exacerbated its 
associated losses. See Houman 8. Shadab, Hedge Funds and the Financial Market, Written Testimony 
Before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 7-14 Nov. 14, 2008, 
http:l/oversight.house.gov/documents/20081113102107.pdf. See also Stephen Brown et al., Hedge 
Funds in the Aftermath of the Financial Crisis 171, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO 
REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 2009 (concluding that "there is very little evidence to suggest that hedge 
funds caused the financial crisis or that they contributed to its severity in any significant way"), 
available at http://whitepapers.stem.nyu.edu/summaries/ch06.html. 
315. CREDIT SUISSE TREMONT, supra note 6, at I; FINA!tematives, Hedge Funds lose $1588 in 
2008, March 3, 2009. 
316. FINAltematives, Global Hedge Fund Assets Fall to $/.ST in 2008, March 5, 2009. 
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unable to withdraw their capital due to restrictions placed on redemptions. 317 
Like other financial institutions, hedge funds realized losses due to having to 
write down the value of loan assets. 318 However, hedge fund investments in 
mortgage-related securities were very limited compared to those of other 
market participants. 319 Hedge fund losses in 2008 were distributed across a 
wide range of hedge fund investment strategies. 320 Yet despite the 
unprecedented 19 percent annual loss, hedge fund performance in 2008 was at 
an all time high relative to the U.S. public equity market, which lost 38.47 
percent of its value. 321 Hedge funds also far outperformed stock mutual funds, 
which lost an average of 37.6 percent in 2008.322 In contrast to the banking 
sector, there is little evidence to suggest that the hedge fund industry was ever 
in danger in collapsing. 323 To the contrary, new hedge funds continued to be 
opened throughout the financial crisis and the funds were not the target of 
b ., 324 government m outs. 
Hedge funds' superior performance relative to other financial institutions 
and the market as a whole is in part attributable to financial innovation by the 
funds and, accordingly, the legal regime enabling and providing incentives for 
such innovation. First, hedge funds' flexible management structures and 
investment policies allowed them to rapidly adapt their trading strategies to 
mitigate or even profit from subprime-related losses. 325 After the collapse of 
317. Matthew Goldstein & David Henry, Bear Bets Wrong, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 22, 2007; Katherine 
Burton, Goldman Global Equity Hedge Fund Rises I 2% After Cash Infusion, Bloomberg Aug. 23, 2007; 
Louise Annitstead, Hedge Fund legends Hit by Financial Crisis, TELEGRAPH, April 6, 2008; Richard 
Wachman, Bloodbath in Mayfair as Half of All Hedge Funds Face Termination, GUARDIAN UK, Oct. 
26, 2008; MarketFolly, 2008 Hedge Fund Performance Numbers: December & Year-End, Jan. 20, 2009, 
available at http://www.marketfolly.com/2009/01 /2008-hedge-fund-performance-numbers.html; Henny 
Sender, On Wall Street: Hedge Fund Won't let Go, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 12, 2008. 
318. IMF, supra note 311, at 14-16 (estimating that hedge funds and certain other nonbank 
financial institutions incurred $60 billion in losses through October 2008). 
3 I 9. Hedge funds held an estimated IO percent of COO equity securities in 2007, which account for 
about half of all hedge fund COO investments. In a typical COO structure, less than 5 percent of the 
securities are equity, which means that the overwhelming majority ofCDO securities were purchased by 
institutions other than hedge funds. See John Lipsky, First Deputy Managing Director, IMF, The Global 
Economy and Financial Markets: Where Next?, Speech at the Lowy Institute, Sydney, Australia, July 
3 I, 2007, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2007/073107a.htm (estimating that 
hedge funds purchased I 0 percent of COO equity); BIS, supra note 311, at 53 tab I. C. I. 
320. See generally CREDIT SUISSE TREMONT, supra note 6. 
321. Econ Stats, S&P 500 Large Cap Index, available at 
http://www.econstats.com/eqty/eqea _mi_ 1.htm. 
322. Rob Wherry, Our Mutual Fund Report Card for 2008, SMART MONEY, Jan. 7, 2009. 
323. See supra note 7. 
324. James Mackintosh, Hedge Funds Cut Down to Size?, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. I I, 2009; 
Johnson, supra note I I; FIN Alternatives, supra note 316. Hedge funds likely benefitted from 
government aid indirectly, however, to the extent such aid prevented banks from making additional 
margin calls to hedge funds and preserved the funds' counterparty relationships. 
325. CREDIT SUISSE TREMONT, HEDGE FUNDS HOLD STEADY IN 2007 3-4, Dec. 13, 2007 ("Many 
hedge funds were able to profit in a difficult environment due to their ability to produce attractive risk 
adjusted returns over short and long term investment horizons by adjusting their positions to de-correlate 
with the broad market."). See also Gregory Zuckerman, Hedge Funds Bounce Back-In a Big Way, 
WALL ST. J. Nov. 19, 2007. 
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investment bank Bear Stearns in March of 2008, hedge funds began using more 
than just one prime broker (such as Bear Stearns) to shield themselves against 
the risk of another prime broker collapsing. When investment bank Lehman 
Brothers declared bankruptcy on September 15, hedge funds largely avoided 
losses associated with Lehman's custody of hedge fund assets. 326 Hedge funds 
have also been adopting other new best practices throughout the financial 
. . 327 
CrISIS. 
Second, hedge fund manager incentives stemming from co-investment and 
performance fees led them to manage and limit risk exposures to subprime-
backed securities while at the same time seeking strategies to profit from their 
mis valuation. Hedge fund managers routinely ignored evaluations of mortgage-
backed securities issued by credit rating agencies and instead did their own 
proprietary research. 328 Third, because of hedge funds' abilities to short sell 
and to trade derivatives without Company Act restrictions, they were able to 
employ innovative investment strategies to profit from subprime mortgage risk 
exposures. 329 
Unlike hedge funds, which were able to provide some significant protection 
to their investors during the financial crisis, mutual funds and banks were 
unable to offer any such protection due in part to the legal regime under which 
they operate. Mutual fund managers lack the incentives provided to hedge fund 
managers from co-investment and performance fees. Mutual funds are also 
unable to adapt their investment strategies to changing market conditions and 
are limited in their ability to employ short sales and utilize derivatives. 330 
326. Pierre Cooper, Hedge Funds Swerve Lehman Crash, HFMWEEK, Sept. 2008. See also Sameer 
Shalaby, The End of the Single Prime Broker Model, ADVANCED TRADING, Sept. 30, 2008. 
327. Pauline Skypala, Hedge Funds Move to Self-Regulate, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009; Ivy 
Schmerken, Hedge Funds Outsource to Independent Fund Administrators, WALL STREET & TECH., Jan. 
6, 2009. 
328. See Rich Blake, House Money, TRADER MONTHLY 40, November 2007 (reporting that hedge 
fund manager Paul Ullman stated that he "can't rely on ratings agencies or underwriters to tell us [a 
credit derivative] is high-grade" and that mortgage "[d]efaults and delinquency likelihoods and 
prepayment drop-offs ... are all, to some extent, knowable if you put the time in"), available at 
http://www.traderdaily.com/magazine/article/12161.html; Zuckerman, supra note 263. See also 
Christine Richard & Katherine Burton, Ackman Devoured 140,000 Pages Challenging MBIA Rating, 
BLOOMBERG, Jan. 31 2008. 
329. Zuckerman, supra note 263 (reporting that the hedge fund managed by John Paulson profited 
$15 billion by implementing a novel investment strategy that entailed purchasing CDS protection and 
short selling COO tranches and the ABX subprime mortgage index ); FINaltematives, Hedge Fund 
Gains 1.000%. Preps Short Credit Fund, Nov. 28, 2007 (reporting that the portfolios of manager 
Andrew Lahde "hold short positions in AA tranches down to BBB- on the ABX Index"); David Gaffen, 
Making Money Off Subprime Declines, Marketbeat, WSJ.com, Feb. 8, 2008 (noting that hedge fund 
manager Don Brownstein profited from subprime by "us[ing] a combination of the ABX and a basket of 
single name credit default swaps, which we were short"); Mark Pittman, Betting on a Crash-The 
Gamble of J. Kyle Bass, NEW ZEALAND HERALD, Jan. I, 2008 (reporting that hedge fund manager J. 
Kyle Bass "used the leveraging effect of derivatives to sell short about US$1.2 billion of sub-prime 
securities"); RISK, Hedge Fund of the Year-Stark Investments, Jan. 2008, Vol. 21 (reporting that two 
Wisconsin-based hedge funds profited by short selling bonds associated with subprime mortgages). 
330. See supra Section LC. I. 
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These activities were required to m1t1gate or profit from subprime-related 
losses. Mutual funds invested in stocks and bonds suffered losses along with 
the rest of the market. 
Commercial bank operators likewise do not possess the high-powered 
incentives of hedge fund managers to manage risk. To the contrary, due to bank 
capital regulation banks had short-term incentives to take on excessive 
mortgage-related risks. 331 In addition, because commercial banks are limited by 
law primarily to the business of making loans, they were unable to diversify 
their investments to reduce their exposure to losses from subprime 
mortgages. 332 And unlike hedge funds, commercial banks are regulated and 
insured pursuant to federal banking law, which undermines the incentive for 
banks and their creditors to appropriately manage risks and engage in other 
forms of market discipline. 333 
Investment banks, on the other hand, have the same ability as hedge funds 
to employ short sales and derivatives and also have high-powered incentives to 
engage in due diligence and investment strategy innovation. This explains why 
some investment banks were able to profit from subprime-related securities in 
the same manner as hedge funds. For example, through their proprietary trading 
desks, Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank utilized derivatives and short sales 
to earn profits of an estimated $4 billion and $1 billion respectively on trades 
related to subprime loan losses. 334 Career concerns and the bonus 
compensation of investment bank executives and traders likely provided 
substantial incentives to engage in the type of research and contrarian 
investment strategies required to mitigate losses or profit from the subprime 
collapse. 
Nonetheless, investment bank professionals lack the full panoply of hedge 
fund incentives and governance structures most conducive to benefiting from 
financial innovations such as CDOs. 335 One reason why Goldman Sachs' and 
Deutsche Bank's trades were relatively uncommon among investment banks 
may be because, unlike hedge fund managers, investment bank traders do not 
331. See generally Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson, Causes of the Financial Crisis, 21 
CRITICAL REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at 
http://growthcommissionblog.org/files/Acharya%20Richardson%20Critical%20Review%20Article.pdf. 
332. See supra notes 180-181 and accompanying text. 
333. See Peter J. Wallison, Healthy Hedge Funds. Sick Banks, American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Policy Research, Financial Services Outlook, February 2008. 
334. Kate Kelley, How Goldman Won Big On Mortgage Meltdown, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2007, at 
A I (reporting that Goldman Sachs trader Michael "Swenson and his traders began shorting certain slices 
of the ABX, or betting against them, by buying credit-default swaps"); Jacqueline Simmons & Elena 
Logutenkova, Deutsche Bank Payday Burgeons on Subprime Trading Bet, BLOOMBERG July 30, 2007; 
Rich Blake et al., Fourth Annual Trades of the Year, TRADER MONTHLY 74, February/March 2008. 
335. See also Steven M. Davidoff, A Partnership Solution for Investment Banks?, Deal Professor, 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 2008, available at http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/08/20/a-partnership-
solution-for-investment-banks/. 
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typically face the risk of losing their own co-invested capital. 336 Investment 
bank underwriters in particular earned performance-based compensation based 
in large part on the volume of securities they underwrote and sold in the 
previous year, and not on whether the securities they sold produced long-term 
gains for clients or caused a long-term price increase of the investment bank's 
stock. 337 
Furthermore, hedge funds' less hierarchical uncorporate governance 
structures generally led the funds to take a more integrated approach toward 
risk management and investment strategy. By contrast, large investment banks 
had trouble properly integrating the mortgage-related securities into their 
established risk-management practices, a deficiency typical of multi-unit firms 
attempting to integrate innovations with existing risk-management routines. 338 
Merrill Lynch, for example, suffered $14.1 billion in losses from subprime-
backed securities in part because credit risk management was inappropriately 
segregated from market risk management. 339 The hierarchical governance 
structure of investment banks and their multiple lines of business created 
conflicts within the company from taking long and short positions in mortgage-
related securities. Hedge fund managers were able to evaluate the mortgage-
related securities market without any preconceived notion about the value of 
such securities. Investment banks, on the other hand, had sold mortgage-related 
securities to their clients and retained such securities on their balance sheets, 340 
and therefore had both economic and reputational reasons to believe that such 
securities were sound investments. For these reasons, the traders at Goldman 
Sachs had "heated debates" about how much capital to devote to trading against 
subprime Joans, and Deutsche Bank's head trader responsible for profiting from 
the subprime collapse had to endure significant criticism from his colleagues 
for taking investment positions against the housing market. 341 No such 
336. See Richard Beales & Rob Cox, Lightly Regulated, Rightly, WALL Sr. J., Feb. 11, 2008, at 
Cl2 (reporting that in contrast to hedge funds "(i]nvestment bankers are often playing with faceless 
shareholders' money" and that "[b]onuses based partly on individual success are almost always going to 
outweigh any losses on bankers' stock holdings in a firm that had a bad year"). 
33 7. See Acharya & Richardson, supra note 331, at 13-15. 
338. DAVID BESANKO, DAVID DRANOVE, MARK SHANLEY & SCOTT SCHAEFER, ECONOMICS OF 
STRATEGY 436 (4th ed. 2006) (noting that established firms already invested in a particular method of 
operation may lack incentives to adapt to change); Deborah Dougherty & Trudy Heller, The Illegitimacy 
of Successful Product Innovation in Established Firm, 5 ORG. SCI. 200, 214 (1994) (finding that a 
common barrier to innovation exists where "the constituent activities of new product development do 
not fit into, or are not a part of, the legitimate system of thought and action"); Wim Vanhaverbeke & 
Nico Peeters, Embracing Innovation as Strategy: Corporate Venturing, Competence Building and 
Corporate Strategy Making, 14 CREATIVITY INNOVATION MGMT. 246, 247 (2005). 
339. See Susanne Craig & Randall Smith, Merrill's Risk Manager, WALL Sr. J., Jan. 18, 2008, at 
Ct. 
340. See Vikas Bajaj, Bankers' lesson From Mortgage Mess: Sell, Don't Hold, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
5, 2007 ("(B]anks kept a sizable part of the bonds issued by their C.D.O.'s on their own books this 
spring and summer."). 
341. Kelley, supra note 334; Blake et al., supra note 334. 
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arguments seemed to have taken place among traders within a hedge fund. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The historical performance of hedge funds suggests that the hedge fund 
legal regime creates sustained benefits for investors despite the unique risks 
and complexity brought about by the funds' innovative investment strategies. 
The lack of legal restrictions on the ability of hedge funds to employ leverage, 
short sell, and use derivatives strongly suggests that investment flexibility is 
highly conducive to creating and utilizing innovative investment strategies with 
relatively low exposures to market risk. In addition, hedge funds' uncorporate 
governance indicates that hedge fund-like incentives to utilize financial 
innovation help market participants strike a relatively healthy balance between 
risk taking and risk management. A general lesson from the law and economics 
of hedge funds is that when a legal regime permits financial institutions to be 
flexible in their investment strategies and aligns the incentives of investors and 
innovators through the right mix of performance fees and managerial co-
investment, financial innovation is likely to complement investor protection. 
As policymakers in light of the financial crisis seek to ensure that investor 
protection is not compromised by rapid financial innovation, the outcomes 
achieved by hedge funds provide important lessons about what type of 
regulatory and governance regimes facilitate innovation while maintaining 
investor protection. Hedge funds substantially outperformed both the public 
equity markets as a whole and the heavily regulated mutual fund industry. 
Unlike banks and other financial institutions, the hedge fund sector was never 
in danger of collapsing nor did losses from hedge funds threaten the financial 
system or require federal rescue measures. The performance of hedge funds 
undermines the notion that mandatory disclosure, direct government oversight, 
and limitations on risk taking (such restrictions on leverage and compensation 
practices) are necessary to advance investor protection. 
From the perspective of protecting hedge fund investors, additional hedge 
fund regulation does not seem warranted. Instead, the role of hedge funds in 
advancing the goal of investor protection suggests that the funds should be 
available to a broader class of investors. In testimony on May 22, 2003 before 
the House Committee on Financial Services, then SEC Chairman William H. 
Donaldson noted that "there is a definite need to examine how hedge funds, 
properly run and properly disclosed, can be allowed to be purchased by retail 
investors."342 One approach to achieving this goal is to reduce the wealth-based 
qualifications required to invest in hedge funds. 343 Hedge funds possess risk 
342. The Long and Short of Hedge Funds: Effects of Strategies for Managing Market Risk: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, And Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. 
Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 16 (2003). 
343. See generally Shadab, supra note 2 (discussing why permitting sophisticated retail investors to 
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and disclosure characteristics comparable to a wide range of investment 
opportunities that U.S. retail investors are currently permitted to invest in, 
including mutual funds that employ hedge fund-like strategies and exchange-
traded funds that attempt to replicate the returns of hedge funds. 344 Hedge 
funds also typically make disclosures sufficient for a wide range of investors to 
make informed investment decisions. In addition, the companies and products 
unsophisticated retail investors are permitted to invest in are not generally safer 
or less prone to fraud, easier to understand, or even more meaningfully 
transparent than hedge funds. 345 Another approach to making the benefits of 
hedge funds more widespread is for policymakers to lift the restrictions on 
mutual funds being able to charge (asymmetric) performance fees and utilize 
leverage, short sales, and derivatives. This approach was suggested by the SEC 
in a 2003 staff report analyzing the growth of hedge funds. 346 
Because hedge fund innovation generally complements the goal of investor 
protection regulation, permitting a wider range of investors to invest in the 
funds would likewise advance regulatory policy goals. Nonetheless, the 
inability of hedge funds to remain immune from fluctuations in the overall 
market and the financial crisis in particular shows that the hedge fund legal 
regime is no panacea for the enduring problem of investment risk. Investors, 
managers, and creditors should remain vigilant about the inherent complexities 
of investing and the ability of losses to rapidly spread across all types of 
investment intermediaries, regardless of the legal regime under which they 
operate. 
have access to hedge funds promotes wealth-maximization and investor protection); Steven M. 
Davidoff, Black Market Capital, 172 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. (2008). 
344. See Houman B. Shadab, An Artifact of law: U.S. Prohibition of Retail Hedge Funds, 24 J. 
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